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LAWYERS AND INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE
CASE OF A PUBLIC HOUSING
EVICTION BOARD
RICHARD LEMPERT*
AND KARL MONSMAt

I
INTRODUCTION

When lawyers think of civil procedure they almost invariably think of the
rules of civil procedure and the formality they entail. A course in civil
procedure focusing almost exclusively on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is in most law schools part of the traditional first-year curriculum. Indeed
some would argue that it is at the core of that curriculum, for more than any
other first-year course it takes students away from familiar moral anchors and
instructs them in a set of distinctively legal practices and values. The ability to
manipulate the legal system's rules of procedure is the most general skill in
which nascent lawyers are instructed.'
But formal rules of civil procedure do not delimit the bounds of civil
actions. Many contested civil actions are heard by tribunals or decisionmakers
that ignore many if not all of the lawyer's rules of civil procedure as well as
associated rules like rules of evidence. These tribunals typically hear the lowstakes disputes that individuals have with each other or with businesses, such
as disputes brought to small claims courts, or the disputes that individuals
Copyright © 1988 by Law and Contemporary Problems. Permission to reprintmmust be pre-cleared
with first atuthor.
*
Protessor of L.aw & Sociology. University of 'Michigan.
t
Center for Research on Social Organization. University of Michigan.
Work ott this paper Was su)o)01ted by grant #SES-86 17981 ft'om the Law and Social Science
Program of the National Science FIoundation and by the Cook Funds of the Univers it of Michigait
Law School. The cooperation of the Hawaii Housing Authoirity was essential to this research. We
would like to thank the many people associated with the Authority who facilitated this investigation
and Professor Paul D. Carrington of' Duke I.aw School, Who galvanized us to write this article and
read and commented ott an earlier version. We also thank Gail Ristow lot work she (lid typing this
manuscript and for not making us feel guihy about the many times we asked her to retype portions of
it and the tight deadlines we imposed. All findings and opinions expressed in this paper arc the
authors' and should not be attributed to the National Science Focindation, the University of
Michigan, or the Hawaii Housing AuLthority.
1. Substantive legal knowledge is essential. butt substantive courses deal with particular
problems, and lawyers who do not practice in an area arc not expected to know mItch about it even if
theyv took a relevant course in law school. Other lawyer skills like negotiation or drafting do ccit
across areas of practice, but the\, are thought to be inborn in the lawyer or not distinctively legal.
Until retentlv courses designed to hone such skills wete seldom taught in the nation's law schools,
.nd even now they tend to he taught in small doses in connection with substantive courses or as
limited enrollment electives.
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have with the government over their eligibility for various entitlements or
their liability to particular penalties. The latter may involve stakes that are
quite high for the individual involved, although perhaps petty from the point
2
of view of the government.
Social scientists often call the procedures in such tribunals "informal" and
speak of their decisions as "informal justice," meaning by informal a tendency
to follow lay rather than professional-legal modes of introducing and arguing
about evidence. Although the point has been cogently-many would say
persuasively-disputed,i such informality is commonly thought to be not only
a strength of, but also a reason for creating, tribunals that are not bound by
the usual rules of legal procedure. One of the purported virtues of informal
tribunals is that they are thought to allow litigants who cannot afford, or
would be unwise to invest in, legal counsel 4 to comprehend what is occurring,
and to present meaningful arguments to the decisionmaker. 5
Whether this rationale withstands scrutiny is a matter that need not
concern us. The important point is that the informality of informal tribunals is
usually an all but inescapable consequence of their design and jurisdiction.
Design features that promote informality include staffing by non-lawyer
judges, rules that prevent or inhibit the use of attorneys, and procedures that
promote conversational modes of presenting and discussing information
while limiting or precluding the resort to specifically legal conceptions of what
is proper. A tribunal's jurisdiction promotes informality when the matters it
encompasses make it likely that litigants will proceed without lawyers or, if
represented, proceed in a non-legalistic way.
Even when tribunals are designed to be informal, the absence of lawyers is
often not a design feature but a consequence of the tribunal's jurisdiction. In
such tribunals, lawyers are permitted-indeed litigants may have a right to
proceed through counsel-but lawyers seldom appear either because the
litigants see no need for attorneys or because, even if they see a need, they
2. These ty pes ol disputes do not exhaust the list of civil actions that proceed even in theory
with little attention to formal rules of procedure. For example, dispties between regulated
industries and the government may be heard initially in informal settings, and civil action stibstiLutes
like arbitration and mediation may similarly dispense with the formal rules of CoI0trt proceedings.
3.
See the essaxs collecied in I R. ABEt.. "I- POIiTICS OF INFORMIALJ.USriCE (1982). See also 2
R. ABFL, "IE POirITICS OF INFORMAL JusTIcE (1 982) (examining informal justice practices and
structures from a comparative perspective).
4. Note that there is a social decision here. There is nothing natural about people lacking
counsel when they cannot affoird it or when the cost would be greater than tie amoiunt at stake.
Society could, as il does for many misdemeanors, subsidize counsel for everyone facing informal
hearings. Stich a decision might soon tiransforln the informal character of such tribunals while at the
same time making informality less necessary. For a discussion of how such a transiformation occurred
in thce workers' compensation context, where large stakes relative to lawyer cost drove the
transformation, see generally 1). NONET, Ai)MtINISTRATIIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CIiAN(;E IN A
(;OVERNMENTAGENCY (1969).
5. Conley and O'Barr point out that in the case of the small clains courts they studied, the
litter ma be an illusion. The failtre of litigants to tell stories that touch the requisite legal bases
mlay cost litigants verdicts even though the litigants feel that they have said everything they wish to
say and that the decisionnaker has attended to them. O'Barr & Conley, litganl Satisfactln IUtrsus
lo.,gal .dq1ac it Small Claims Court .Narratives, 19 L.,AW
& Soc')" REV. 661, 684-90 (1985).

Page 135: Autumn 1988]

LAWYERS AND INFORMAL JUSTICE

cannot acquire attorneys. In these circumstances those lawyers who on
occasion happen to represent litigants will find a tribunal that has been
shaped without regard for their interests or usual modes of proceeding. The
procedures they confront may seem not only unfamiliar but also
inappropriate for adjudication. If lay judges preside, lawyers may find that
they have to put their arguments in "client vernacular," although they are
accustomed to putting clients' stories into legal language. Moreover, because
legal representation in such tribunals is rare, many lawyers who do appear will
be either infrequent or one-time participants and so will lack the knowledge
and other advantages that accrue to repeat players."
Yet even while retaining its informality, a tribunal may be affected by the
sporadic appearances of attorneys. It will, for example, want to be certain that
it touches any legal bases that apply in the situations it adjudicates, for the
occasional appearance of lawyers will make threats of appeal to formal courts
on questions of law credible. 7 Moreover, informal tribunals are not without
rules or procedure." Even the occasional presence of lawyers may lead an
informal tribunal to restructure its proceedings, perhaps bringing them more
in line with lawyer expectations.
II
A PUBLIC HOUSING EvIcriON BOARD

We propose to study how lawyers function before informal tribunals by
looking at the performance of lawyers before a public housing eviction board.
The board has processed all eviction actions brought by the Hawaii Housing
Authority ("the Authority") on the island of Oahu since December 1957. We
shall, however, look only at the twenty-year period from 1966 through 1985.'
Throughout its history the board has had the power of an ordinary court
in deciding whether to evict tenants" ' and in issuing writs of possession
enforceable by the sheriff. '' However, the procedural rules of ordinary courts
do not apply. Although tenants are given notice of the charges, neither side
engages in formal discovery; rules of evidence do not structure hearings;
testimony is ordinarily delivered in narrative rather than question -and-answer
te "llaves' Come Out
6. Galanter, W /hy
Soc's REv. 95, 114-19 (1974).

.lhead.

SpeuIioos on he 1,1i111s of le~ga ChaOnge. 9 LAW &

7. The relationship of infornal cotLs to fornal courts varies b\ the type of tibunal and by the
problems with which it deals. In some instances informality, which mnav extend to the denial of

certain basic rights such as the right to counsel, is justified because the partics must consent to the
tribunal's jurisdiction and/or a party dissatisfied with the tribunal's decision has a right to a de novo

trial in a inore formal Court. In other instances review by mote formal courts may be limited to
(questions of law including, perhaps, the issue of whether the factual findings of the informal tribunal
were supported by substantial evidence.
8. See Lempert, The Dnamics of ltformal Prou'dure. The (.le of a Public Housing Eviction Board, LAW
& Soc'v REVIEW (forthconing 1989) [hereinafter D-naiics].
9. Out current data set only covers this period. Ai one time, howvTer, the first aithor
examined data fIom 1957 through June 1969. l)uring thie period from 1957 to 1966 lawyers wetre
almost never present.
10.
Hss. RFv\. StAi. § 360-5 (1980) as amended.
II. Id
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fashion; and board members feel free to question and on occasion even
lecture tenants and other witnesses. Indeed, when in 1980 the Authority
sought to regularize the status of the board by adopting formal administrative
rules governing the board's powers and proceedings, one of the rules it
enacted provided: "Hearings shall be conducted in an informal manner
12
unless otherwise required by law."'
Appeal from the board's decision is to the Commissioners of the Authority
and beyond them to the Circuit Court for the First Circuit of Hawaii. Until
1980 the Commissioners heard appeals de novo and for some time after that
they would hold hearings to determine if "new facts and evidence" sufficient
to trigger an appeal were present.' I In 1984 the task of determining whether
an appeal met the new facts and evidence standard was delegated to the
Executive Director, and since then appellate hearings have been pro forma
ratifications of stipulated agreements that the tenant has made with the
executive staff. 14
Tenants may be represented by lawyers at or before the hearing, after the
hearing but before an appeal has been filed, after filing for an appeal, or after
the appeal. Lawyers may represent tenants at only one stage or at various
stages, beginning, for example, before the hearing and ending after an
appeal.
The Authority's eviction board (now called the "hearing board") is
composed entirely of non-lawyers. From 1966 through 1969 the board
consisted of five citizen volunteers. In 1970 two tenants were added to the

board, and in October 1979 a second seven-member panel was added so that
cases could be heard every week rather than every other week without unduly
burdening the board members. During the late 1960's and throughout most
of the 1970's a large proportion of the non-tenant members of the board were
people whose professional or other volunteer activities were characterized by
a special concern for the poor. In the late 1970's, however, the Authority
15
began to look for people with business backgrounds when vacancies arose.
Today, more board members spend their working lives in real estate sales and
management than in any other profession.
The board's docket is dominated by cases involving non-payment of rent;
over the years non-payment has been the only charge in about three-quarters
12.

HAw. Ai)M. RULES, ch. 501, § 17-501-12(c) (efllcivc Jan. 1, 1981).

13.

An Amendment to Article 360 in 1980 provided that an appeal to the Commissioners was

available only when the tenant could offer new facts and evidence that were not, and could not have
been, presented at the hearing. HAW. REV. STAT. § 360-7(c) (1980) as amended.
14. The usual new fact or evidence is that a tenant evicted fot non-paymcent of rent has, since tile
hearing, paid everything that was owing at the hearing and has paid all rent that has become due
between the hearing and the appeal. In these circumstances the Authorily enters into a stipulated
agreement whereby the tenant waives all rights to hearings or appeals should she violate any lease
provision within the next year, and the Authority agrees to withhold service of the eviction order that
the board has issued and to cancel it if the tenant complies fully with her lease obligations over the
succeeding 12

ionlihs.

15. When the second panel was created in 1979, the original board was split in two, creating
seven vacancies, two of' which were filled by tenants.
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of all board actions. Until the board split into two panels the most commonand for a long time the almost universal-board verdict in non-payment cases
was the conditional deferment. When the board conditionally defers, it issues
an eviction order but withholds service of the order on the condition that the
tenant repay her past debt according to some fixed schedule and pay board
current11.8 0 08.3 Tm (b
rent when due. Both tenants and managers regard conditional deferments as
tenant victories. In recent years this pattern of preferring "conditions" to
outright evictions has been reversed, and tenants who appear before the
board owing rent are invariably evicted without conditions, subject only to a
right to appeal.'
Other tenants are brought before the board for violations of basic rules of
neighborliness and project life, such as hiding income, keeping pets,
sheltering unauthorized guests, behaving violently, parking inoperative
vehicles, and the like. For many years tenants charged with such offenses
were more likely to be evicted by the board than those behind on their rent.
Now this situation too is reversed, not because the board has become more
lenient in such cases, but because it has become stricter when rent is due. In
recent years, tenants charged with behavioral violations have in fact faced a
greater likelihood of eviction than they did in the more distant past, but the
increased likelihood has not been nearly so great as it has been in the cases of
tenants in arrears.

11.8 0 08.3 Tm (but0 0 1il10.80 020 0 87 396.DATATm (in8Tj10
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hearing transcripts which were read. Finally, Authority documents relating to
the eviction process and the docket records of most cases involving lawyers
were perused for information that could not be captured by simple coding.
IV
QUESTIONS OF INTEREST

This article focuses on lawyers' 7 who represented or otherwise acted on
behalf of tenants. Although the Authority has had a lawyer as its "hearing
officer" (prosecutor) since 1982, he or she ordinarily proceeds informally, if
we may judge by what the first author observed in 1987; and it appears that
the fact that the hearing officer is a lawyer rather than a lay specialist has few
implications for board action. I8
Tenants'

attorneys represented their clients in different ways.

These

different styles of representation and their consequences are a central focus of
this article. They are interesting not only for what they reveal about how
lawyers serve clients in informal tribunals, but also for what they reveal about
the different ways in which lawyers can react when confronted with
institutions of informal justice. " This article examines both the portrait that
quantitative data paint about lawyer involvement in the eviction process and
the more textured picture of lawyers' reactions to the eviction process that
interviews, transcripts, and Authority records allow us to draw.

We are aware of no other work that focuses on lawyers and informal justice
and seeks to trace the style and consequences of legal representation before
informal tribunals.2-'
However, we expect that the characteristics and
17. Ordinarily where we use the word "lawver" or "attorney," we mean to include legal aid
paralegals as well. Where we mean to distinguish legal aid lawyers from paralegals we will use the
term "supervising attorney," or the context will make this clear.
18. The fact that the hearing officer works full time managing evictions appears very important,
however. See Dvnamics, supra note 8. When a non-lawyer filfilled this role, except for factors
idiosyncratic to him as a person, he did not act very differently from the two lawyers who succeeded
him. The two lawyers seem as different from each other as they do from their non-lawyer
predecessor. Moreover, the pattern of board decisions under the first lawyer is more like the pattern
under her non-lawyer predecessor than it is like the pattern that her lawyer successor established.
19. One may also find these styles of lawyering in formal courts, although the mix of styles and
the stage of the proceedings at which they are used may differ. We simply do not address the issue of
how lawyers perform in formal tribunals.
20. There are some studies that look at styles of representation in the juvenile court after it was
supposedly formalized following In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For example, Professors Stapleton
and Teitlebaum examined the performance of specially trained "project" lawyers in two juvenile
courts. They found that the clients of the project lawyers did better than unrepresented clients or
the clients of non-proJect lawyers in the court in which the project lawers took a more
legalistic/adversarial approach to representation but riot in the court where they failed to do this.
tHowever, it is not clear that the lawyers in the latter court would have done better by being more
legalistic/adversarial since their stance was shaped by the conditions in the court before which they
appeared. See W. STIAPLETON & I.. Iiri.IEiBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF- YOUTH (1972).
Other studies, most of which were conducted in the United Kingdom, examine the consequences
of legal representation before informal tribunals but do not tic consequences to style. The most
elaborate of these, which we received after this manuscript was in press, is H. GENN & Y. GENN, TE
EFFECTIVENESS OF REi'RESiENTATION AT IRIBUNAI.S (1989). The Gens examine four tribunals-Social
Security Appeal Tribunals, Immigration Adjudicators, Industrial lribunals, and Mental Health
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implications of legal representation reflect substantial interaction between the
type of informal forum, the issues the tribunal must resolve, the client
population, caseloads, the factors that link attorneys to clients, and the
opportunity to force formal court hearings. Thus, we do not claim to be able
to derive a general theory of lawyers and informal justice from our study of
the Authority's eviction board. We do think, however, that we shall learn
something more about lawyering, about the representation of impoverished
clients, and about informal justice from observing lawyers in one setting
where they are adrift without their usual procedural anchors. If others are
stimulated to do similar work in different settings, a more general theory may
emerge.
V
LAWYERS AT HEARINGS

Lawyers were almost never involved in eviction hearings in the 1960's.
The reasons were simple. Few tenants could afford lawyers and most did not
need lawyers to succeed before the eviction board. Non-payment of rent has
always been the most common reason why tenants face the board, accounting
over the years for about three-fourths 2 ' of the board's docket. In only eight
of the 160 non-payment-only cases brought between June 1960 and June
1969 was the tenant evicted at the first board hearing. The other tenants
either had their cases dismissed or, in the overwhelming majority of cases,
were granted conditional deferments. 2 2 When other Authority rules had been
violated, such as rules regarding pets, parking, guests, violent behavior, and
income reporting, tenants during this period did not fare as well as when nonpayment alone was charged, but even in these cases tenants won a dismissal or
23
a conditional deferment more than half of the time.
The reasons tenants did so well before the board during a period when
lawyers were almost never seen is not a central concern of this article. It is
sufficient to say that the reasons had to do with the composition of the board,
the precedents that the board had developed, and the stance that the
Authority's central office staff took toward the board and its cases. 2 4 These
factors all changed over time as did the presence of attorneys. We are
concerned here with that presence-with its magnitude, with its
manifestations, and, ultimately, with its consequences for the eviction process.
Review tribtunais-and conclude that in each of them individual parties are aided by representation,
although in some lay representalton seems as effective as legal representation.
21. Of the 1261 cases subpoenaed between 1966 and 1985 for which we know the cause of
action, about 74% involve only the charge of non-payment of rent while an additional 6% involve a

charge of non-payntent along with one or more other charges. In the data we present, the latter
cases will be coded in the category o1 the other charge, for if non-payment alone were suflicient to
guarantee an eviction, the Authority would not need to go to the grealer trouble of proving some

other charge.
22. See R. liemperi, Evictions From 'ublic -lousing: A Sociological Inquiry (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. Univ. of Mich. 1972).

23.

Id.

24.

a not e 8.
See get'rali ' Driamc. .r (Ia
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VI
THE MAGNITUDE OF LAWYER INVOLVEMENT

The story of lawyer involvement in the eviction process is in large measure
the story of legal aid's willingness to represent tenants, for about 80 percent
of those tenants who have had legal representation have been represented by
either a legal aid attorney or paralegal. For this reason both the amount and
quality of tenant representation over the years has in large measure reflected
the policies and priorities of the Legal Aid Society of Honolulu ("LASH").
Table 1 reports, for six time periods, the proportion of docketed cases in
which lawyers were involved in some way. The periods in Table 1 are defined
substantively.2 5 During the first period the operation and decisions of the
board were much like they were before LASH arrived in Hawaii as part of the
Johnson Administration's War on Poverty. The second period, 1975-77, was
a period when LASH brought several class actions on behalf of Authority
tenants and for a time brought the eviction process to a halt. The third period
was a bridge period as the Authority, which had undergone sweeping
administrative changes, sought to deal with the backlog of cases that were a
legacy of the earlier litigation and pondered ways to make its eviction process
more rational and efficient.
The last three periods are labeled with letters that represent the
Authority's hearing officers. A was the first person the Authority hired with
full-time responsibility for managing the eviction process and prosecuting
cases before the eviction board. A was not a lawyer, but he saw himself as
acting like an attorney in negotiating pre-hearing settlements and in
prosecuting cases. The period labeled A runs from mid-October 1979 to
January 1982. In fact, A arrived before October 1979, but we commence the
period at this point because it marks the establishment of a second eviction
panel, which resulted in an infusion of new blood on the eviction board and a
marked increase in the rate of hearings.2 6 There was, when A took over, a
marked increase in the proportion of non-payment tenants evicted,
particularly in cases where less than three months' rent was due.2 7 Period B
begins when B took over the position of hearing officer in mid-January of
25. Cases that had hearings are classified by the date of'the first hearing. Cases that did not hasve
hearings are classified b% the date at which the subpoena was issued.
26. The Authoritv's primary purpose in appointing a second panel was to be able to have a
board meeting each week, thus increasing the pace at which eviction actions could be heard and
diminishing the delay between the time of (lie
subpoena and the hearing in the case of individual
tenants. [he Authority used the institution of a second panel to divide the existing board and
appoint additional members, like private real estate managers, who were expected to have a more
"business-like" attitude toward evictions. [he Aulhoritv also gave all board members a training
session at which the Authority's rent collection difficulties and its need for board cooperation were
stressed.
27. From 1966 through 1977 no non-payment tenant whose rent debt was three months or less
was evicted at the first hearing. In 1978-79 only one of 14 tenants with a rent debt of three months or
less was evicted at the first hearing. Undei ., 32 of'the 88 tenants with such debts were evicted at the
first hearing. Tlhese figures exclude tenants who paid off their entire debt before the hearing. Before
.1 took over, cases where pre-hearing payment occurred were almost invariably cancelled. See
l)yantti<, su/a note 8, at Fable 4.
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1982.2 1 B was the first lawyer to serve as hearing officer. She was officially a
deputy attorney general and not in the Authority's chain of command, but for
all practical purposes she answered to the head of housing with respect to
general eviction policies. The same is true of C, a deputy attorney general
who replaced B in late February 1984. By the time C quit his post in
September 1987 the board was far more likely to evict in non-payment cases
29
than it had been under either A or B.
Turning to Table 1, we see that while defense counsel are not regularly
involved in the eviction process, their involvement is by no means rare, as 108
of the 1268 cases for which we have data contain some indication of lawyer (or
paralegal) involvement on a tenant's behalf.
TABLE

I

PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH LAWYERS BY PERIOD*
PERIOD

Percentage
of Cases With
lawyers
Total Cases
Commenced by
Subpoena

1966-74

1975-77

1978-79

A

B

C

Total

9.2%
(18)

6.4%
(9)

4.3%
(5)

10.5%
(33)

8.7%
(30)

8.2%
(13)

8.5%
(108)

195

140

115

315

345

158

1268

* Number of cases with lawyers in parentheses.

We see that the rate of lawyer involvement averaged more than 8 percent
but was markedly lower during the years 1975-79. This decrease is surprising
since we know that from 1975 to 1977 the Authority's eviction board was
under severe legal attack by LASH attorneys. In fact, the picture is misleading
in that, because of the ongoing litigation and its aftermath, only 25 percent of
the cases commenced by subpoena in the 1975-77 period had a hearing,
which is less than one-third of the percentage of cases going to hearing in the
next lowest period.
Table 2 gives the proportion, by period, of hearings in which tenants had
attorneys, and Table 3 gives the proportion of tenants evicted at the hearings
who had lawyers on appeal.

28. This was some months after .-1 had left the Autlhrity. We cotnt these months in period A in
the expectation that the tone .4 set is likely to have endured until a permanent replacement was in
office. We employ a similar convention in coding the interim between B and C.
29. This conclusion is based on inierviews and observation. Our quantitative data only run
through 1985. To this point they show the board under C distinctly more prone to evict than it was
in period B whenever anv rent was owing, but more prone to evict than in period A only when more
than three months" rent was owing.
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2

PERCENTAGE OF CASES GOING TO HEARING WITH A-ITORNEYS AT OR
BEFORE HEARING

By

PERIOD*

PERIOD
Percentage
of Cases With
Attorneys

Total Number
of Cases Going
to Hearing

1966-74

1975-77

1978-79

A

B

C

Total

7.5%
(12)

8.8%
(3)

1.2%
(1)

6.8%
(18)

3.2%
(10)

4.1%
(6)

5.0%
(50)

159

34

85

266

315

146

1005

* Number of cases with attorneys at or before hearing in parentheses.

TABLE

3

PERCENTAGE OF APPEALED CASES WITH ATTORNEYS AIDING ON
APPEAL

By

PERIOD*
PERIOD

Percentage
of Cases With
Attorneys

Total Number
of Appeals

1966-74

1975-77

1978-79

A

B

C

Total

38.9%
(7)

50%
(2)

11.8%
(2)

23.2%
(16)

16.7%
(15)

5.9%
(3)

8.1%
(45)

18

4

17

69

90

51

249

* Number of cases with attorneys in parentheses.

We gain from these tables a somewhat different picture of lawyer
involvement with the eviction board and changes over time. : 't Looking only at
cases that went to hearing, the 1975-77 period represents in percentage terms
the peak of lawyer involvement in the eviction process both at hearings and on
appeal.'
Moreover, except for the period 1978-79, when legal
representation dipped markedly at both stages, there has been a general
diminution over time in the probability that a tenant will have legal help either
at the hearing or on appeal.32 Had data been available for 1986 and 1987, the
30. One cannot derive Table I b% combining Tables 2 and 3 because a lawyer might be involved
in the same case both at the hearing and on appeal, and lawyers were involved in some cases that did
not reach a hearing and in other cases only after the appeal.
31. The small number of hearings and appeals dturing this period means rhat we cannot make
too much of these percentages. But it is safe to conclude that the 1975-77 period does not represent
a drop-off in rates of lawyer involvement when the major occasions fot lawyer involvement (hearing
and appeal) are controlled.
32. The pattern is smoother for appealed cases than for those going to hearing. Controlling foi
cause of action, the probability of attorney involvement in non-payment cases going to hearing is
similar in periods A and C and lower in period B, and lower in all three of these periods than in the
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drop-off of legal representation in period C, according to both LASH
informants and C, would have been greater still.
Note that lawyers often became involved in the eviction process only after
the board had voted to evict the tenant. Over the period of the study,
attorneys represented tenants at hearings only fifty times. Thus, the actual
involvement of attorneys in informal board hearings was substantially less
than their apparent involvement in the eviction process; 5 percent of cases
going to hearing had a lawyer at or before the hearings, although 9.8 percent
of these cases used a lawyer's services at some point in the eviction process. ""
Tables 1, 2, and 3 only capture the involvement of lawyers in the eviction
process when there is a paper trail preserved in the Authority's records.
When a tenant consults a lawyer, and the lawyer tells the tenant how to
behave before the board or what to say in a letter of appeal but does not write
a letter himself or take other steps to represent the tenant, the tenant shows
up in our data as unrepresented, although she may have benefitted from legal
advice. In recent years especially, it appears that legal aid attorneys often
refuse to represent tenants, but give them some advice about what they must
do to retain their units (usually pay the rent debt) before sending them on
their way. This informal assistance may aid some tenants facing eviction in
ways our data do not capture.
Table 4 shows how representation has varied by attorney type over time.34

first two periods. In income falsification cases there are no lawyers at hearings in any periods with
the exception of one case each in periods A and B; so there is no meaningful trend. When cases
brought for the various other reasons are aggregated, the probability of counsel is similar in periods
A and B, but lower in C. There are no such cases with attorneys in the 1975-77 and 1978-79 periods,
but in the former period only two cases fall into this category. The proportion of cases with counsel
between 1966 and 1974 is slightly greater than in period C but less than in periods A and B.
33. Some attorneys who represented tenants on appeal, particularly before 1980 when appeals
might involve de novo hearings, also participated in hearings that were informal in the sense that the
Authority's Commissioners, who judged appeals, were lay persons and basic legal rules of procedure
did not apply. Including cases that were docketed but resolved without a hearing, there were
attorneys present at some stage in 8.5%" of the eviction actions.
34. One case with an attorney is excluded from the Table because we cotild not tell if the
attornev was with LASH or was a member of the private bar.
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF CASES* By PERIODS WITH ATTORNEYS OF
DIFFERENT TYPES
PERIOD

1966-74

1975-77

1978-79

A

B

C

Total

By LASH
Attorneys

6.7%
(13)

5.0%
(7)

1.7%
(2)

2.5%
(8)

1.7%
(6)

1.3%
(2)

3.0%
(38)

By LASH
Paralegal

-

2.6%

5.1%

3.8%

4.4%

3.1%

(3)

(16)

(13)

(7)

(39)

-

.6%

.6%

.6%

Percentage
of Cases
Represented:

By LASH.
I ype Unclear

1.5%

.7%

-

8.2%
(16)

5.7%
(8)

4.3%
(5)

7.6%
(24)

6.1%
(21)

6.3%
(10)

6.6%
(84)

1.0%
(2)

.7%
(1)

.0%

2.5%
(8)

2.6%
(9)

1.9%
(3)

1.8%
(23)

(3)

Total
LASH
Private
Attorney

-

(1)

(2)

(1)

(7)

N = 1968

* Number of cases in parentheses.

Bearing in mind that the percentage figures for 1975-77 are deflated relative
to those for other periods because of the large number of cases that did not
go to hearing, it appears that LASH supervising attorneys were relatively
active on behalf of tenants until about 1977, and then their presence diminished dramatically. The drop-off in appearances by LASH attorneys coincides
with a major class action victory in a case brought by LASH to secure the
Authority's compliance with HUD grievance regulationsi 5 It also seems to
reflect a transfer within LASH of responsibility for public housing evictions
from its lawyer staff to its paralegals. The two may be related, for once LASH
felt that the Authority was complying with the various rules and regulations
governing its eviction process, it may have seen the problems of tenants
facing eviction as routine matters that could be handled by paralegals.
Indeed, LASH apparently designated one paralegal as its specialist in public
housing evictions. He was involved in at least nineteen cases arising between
1980 and 1984.
Overall, legal aid handled more than three cases for every case handled by
a private attorney; and this is true of every period except B, where the ratio is
closer to two-to-one. While the proportion of tenants represented by private
attorneys is always small, there is a marked increase in that proportion, both
35.

See the discussion of the Tileia case in the text accompanying notes 79 through 84 below.
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absolutely and relative to LASH representation, during the 1980's. It is difficult to say why this occurred. It may reflect Reagan era cutbacks in legal services funding and the willingness of some members of the private bar to leap
into the breach. It may also reflect the increasing number of LASH alumni
who were joining the private Honolulu bar and may have been particularly
willing to take eviction cases, for we know that at least some of the private
attorneys who represented tenants had had prior legal aid experience. In
addition, it may reflect the relative well-being of some tenant families and
their desire for real lawyers at a time when LASH was only willing to provide
paralegals.
Table 5 relates attorney usage to the reason the Authority sought
eviction."'

TABLE
LAWYER REPRESENTATION

By

5

CAUSE OF ACTION AND ATTORNEY

TYPE

37

CAUSE OF ACTION
Percentage
of All Cases
With Attorneys*

Percentage
of Attorney
Cases With
Private Attornevs*

NP

Fals.

Guests

Pets

5.2%
(48)

10.1%
(10)

26.9%
(14)

14.6%
(7)

30.0%
(3)

14.3%
(2)

01"

Misc.

Total

20.9%
(14)

20.8%
(21)

9.1%
(1)

8.6%
(108)

28.6%
(4)

30.0%
(6)

100.0%
(1)

21.5%
(23)

* Number of cases in parentheses.

36. When more than one lease violation was charged, we coded cases involving non-payment
and a behavioral charge by the behavioral charge because we felt that the Authority would ordinarily
not take the trouble to prove the behavioral charge if it were certain it could evict for non-payment.
Where more than one behavioral violation was charged one of the violations always involved "Other
Trouble' while the other involved falsification, guests, or pets. See illjia note 37 for category
definitions. We coded these cases into whichever of the three more specific categories applied. All
told 118 of 1261 cases involved multiple charges, and in 74 of these cases non-payment was the only
other violation.
37. "Non-payment" ("NP-) is failure to pay rent; "Falsification" ("Fals.") involves not reporting
or misreporting income at the annual examination used to determine the next sear's rent; "Guests"
involves letting unauthorized persons live in the unit; "Pets" involves keeping animals-almost
always dogs-in violation of Authority rules; "'Other Trouble' ("OT") includes other troublesome
behavior such as fighting, unsanitary housekeeping, or parking inoperable vehicles, and
"miscellaneous" ("Misc.") includes other, often technical, lease violations such as the refusal to
transfer to a proper size unit.
In one case in the OT category we know that the tenant had an attorney but do not know if thc
attorney came from legal aid or was privately retained. We omit this case when we calculate the
percentage of represented OF tenants with private attorneys and the overall percentage of
re)resented tenants with private attorneys.
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Looking at the second row in Table 5 we see a suggestion of a wealth effect
in the fact that 14.6 percent of those tenants charged with non-payment of
rent who were represented by a lawyer had a private attorney compared with
25 percent of those charged with behavioral violations. 18 Moreover, private
attorneys account for 30 percent of the attorneys representing tenants
charged with income falsification, the offense that is most suggestive of higher
than average income. '
Looking at the first line of Table 5, we see that tenants are substantially
less likely to have attorneys in cases brought for non-payment of rent than
they are in cases where guests, pets, or what we call "other trouble" behavior
is charged. 4 1 The rate of attorney usage is intermediate for income falsification, although closer to the pattern in non-payment cases. The rate for miscellaneous lease violations is like that for falsification, but there are so few
cases in this category that there is no point in attempting an explanation.
The difference between non-payment cases and behavioral violations is
striking. It must represent differences in the propensity of tenants facing eviction to seek out lawyers and/or differences in the propensity of lawyers to take
on clients. In particular, since so many tenants are represented by legal aid
and can afford no other attorneys, the pattern may reflect LASH policies of
selective representation.
We think that both tenants, in their propensity to seek out attorneys, and
attorneys (particularly LASH attorneys), in their propensity to take on clients,
respond to the same considerations. These are that non-payment of rent
cases are ordinarily open and shut on the facts and raise no great value
issues. 4' Pet cases, by contrast, are often seen-by tenants especially-to
raise important value issues, 4 2 and guest and other trouble cases are often
hotly disputed on the facts. Thus, in the eviction setting, lawyers tend to
38. These include guests, pets, and other trouble. See snpra note 37.
39. Usually when tenants conceal income it is income from some source other than the principal
wage earner's full-time earnings. Common sources of concealed income are second jobs, a spouse's
earnings, and part-time or temporary employment. The amount saved in rent from concealing
income is often in the range of a thousand dollars or more, and there are cases in which it has been in
excess of $5,000. This will depend on the amount concealed and the length of time it goes
undiscovered.
40. This is true of all the time periods except 1975-77 and 1978-79. In the former period only
four cases involving these offenses reached the hearing stage, and in the latter period. attorney
usage, for reasons we cannot identify, was low for all causes of action.
41. Income falsification cases tend to be similar in these respects, although in some cases there
is a genuine question about whether a tenant realized that a certain type of income had to be
reported.
42. Justifications that would appeal to middle-class values were more common in such cases than
in those brought for other reasons. The most common justification was that a dog was kept for
security reasons. The most compelling justification we encountered was offered by a grandnother
who said that a pet was necessary for the psychological well-being of her young grandson (whom she
was raising). The grandmother's claim was supported by a social worker and by school reports
stating that when she had temporarily removed the dog her grandson's behavior had markedly
deteriorated. Nevertheless the Authority and the board refused to allow her to keep the dog, and the
grandmother moved to avoid depriving her grandson.
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appear for tenants when it seems that their special skills will make a difference. 4 3 Our data do not allow us to distinguish between tenant self-selection
and attorney selection in explaining this association, but LASH interviewees
reported that in recent years they counseled but refused to represent most
non-payment tenants who approached them for aid. They felt, correctly, that
if the tenant could pay her back rent she would be allowed to stay regardless
of their involvement, and if she could not pay her back rent there was nothing
they could do. As a result, in periods B and C combined, lawyers appear in
only about 1 percent of the non-payment cases heard by the eviction board,
and in only about 5 percent of non-payment appeals. During the same two
periods 17.5 percent of the sixty-three tenants charged with guests, pets, or
other trouble behavior had a lawyer's aid at or before their first hearing, and
40.9 percent of the twenty-two people who appealed evictions on these counts
44
had a lawyers's assistance on appeal.
We have looked thus far at some simple statistics describing the role that
lawyers play in the eviction process. 4 5 We see that, although the eviction process was designed to proceed without lawyers and largely did so during the
first decade of its existence, since the coming of the federally funded legal aid
program to Oahu, lawyers have been regular if infrequent participants in the
Authority's eviction process both at hearings and on appeal. Legal aid attorneys account for the bulk of the representation, but private attorneys represent tenants as well, particularly in cases other than non-payment. We have
no way of knowing what proportion of private attorneys in our study were
working on a pro bono basis, but in the case files several statements from
private attorneys indicate that they were working pro bono, and other statements from other private attorneys indicate that they were being paid for their
services-sometimes by noting that expected payments had not been made.
We also observed a number of cases in which private attorneys were involved
only to the extent of writing a letter or making a phone call-behavior usually
4
associated with low-fee or no-fee representation. "
43.

The relationship between lawyer involvenent and case type is similar at the hearing and on
before the
hearing in 2.3% of non-payment cases: 2.5% of falsification cases: 22.7% of guest cases: 14.5% of
pet cases: and 16.0% of cases involving other trouble behavior. Considering only those cases
appealed, lawyers were involved in 9.1% of non-payment appeals; 26.1% of falsification appeals;
38.5% of guest appeals; 36.4% of pet appeals; and 54.2% of appeals in cases involving other trouble
appeal except in the case of income falsification appeals. Iassvers were present at or

behavior.

44. However, all of the latter instances of lawyer use were in period B. In period C none of the
seven tenants who appealed on these counts had a lawyer to assist them. [his may be because at the
outset of period C the Authorits's Commissioners delegated to the Executive )irector the
responsibility of determining if there were new facts and evidence sutficient tojustifN an appeal. This
meant that an attorney' appealing such a case could not appear before the Commissioners to argue
that the appeal should be heard, but could only petition the staff. Attorness may have felt that in
these circumstances there was little thes' could do to help tenants.
45. We are currently working on a paper that will explain with the aid of multivariate models the
likelihood that tenants will have attorneys and the effects of representation on delay and outcomles.
46. l.ochner, The .Vo Fee And Lo1 Fee Legal Patice Of PioZ'a/e .lItoooeys. 9 LAW & Soc'\' RE.v. 431.
455-59 (1975).
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The involvement of lawyers in the eviction process changed over time.
Lawyer involvement both at the hearing and on appeal was, for some reason
we cannot identify, sharply down in 1978-79, the period following LASH's
greatest triumph, and then again diminished after 1982 in the periods we have
labeled B and C. Beginning in period A (from October 1979) and continuing
through periods B and C, private representation, while never high, is, both as
a proportion of all cases and in relation to LASH representation, about twice
what it had been in the prior fourteen years. We will offer some possible
explanations for these patterns later in this article, but they are quite
speculative.

We feel we are on somewhat firmer ground when we look at the kinds of
cases in which attorneys appeared. Attorneys were relatively unlikely to
appear in non-payment cases and much more likely to appear when the charge
involved sheltering unauthorized guests, keeping pets, or engaging in other
trouble behavior. We believe this is because neither tenants nor attorneys see
much of a role for lawyers when an open and shut violation of a generally
accepted rule is alleged. Tenants want attorneys and attorneys are willing to
represent tenants before informal tribunals when cases present conflicting
factual allegations or otherwise pose issues similar to those posed in ordinary
contested litigation.
VII
ISSUES OF STYLE

Now we shall turn our attention to the ways in which attorneys represent
tenants before informal tribunals. We were able to identify three distinct
styles. The first we call legalistic. It involves an attempt to impose legal rules
on the tribunal. The rules may be procedural or substantive but are often the
former, as when a lawyer at the hearing objects to evidence as if he were in
court or moves for a dismissal before the hearing because the tenant's notice
of the Authority's intention to evict did not meet a statutory deadline. The
second is what we call tenant style. Lawyers employing this style make the same
kinds of arguments that unrepresented tenants might make or encourage
tenants to do the same things-like paying back rent-that unrepresented
tenants often do if they wish to remain in housing. The third we call the service
style. Lawyers employing this style use their professional skills to help tenants
deal with agents, other than the Authority, that either have contributed to a
tenant's current situation or can help her escape it. The service most
frequently encountered was helping tenants secure money from welfare
agencies to pay the rent. Other services include filing for bankruptcy to help
tenants cope with debts and securing peace bonds or similar restraining
orders against violent ex-spouses whose project visits have motivated the
Authority's decision to evict.
While the legalistic and tenant styles suggest distinct attitudes toward the
usefulness of law, the service style is a melange. The services that lawyers
perform for tenants often involve arguing legalistically or otherwise
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manipulating the law, but once these services have been accomplished,
argument to the board usually follows the tenant style. Often a strong tenant
style argument can be made because the lawyer's service has given the tenant
the wherewithal to correct the lease violation or gives the board a special
reason to accept the tenant's promise to cure the violation and not relapse in
the future.
Table 6 presents the basic breakdown of lawyer styles by period, and Table
7 breaks down style by cause of action. 4 7 We see from Table 6 that the
tendency to resort to the tenant style appears to have increased markedly
beginning in period A when the Authority reorganized its eviction processes
by appointing a full-time eviction specialist and a second eviction panel. It
was also in this period that the statute establishing the eviction board was
amended, and rules regulating the board's procedures were adopted in
accordance with the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act. 48 At the same
time, the utilization of the service style, which accounts for a high proportion
of the cases between 1975 and 1979 but never a large number, falls off. To
some small extent, this increased tendency to use a tenant style may be due to
the fact that LASH paralegals appeared in only three cases before period A
but in thirty-six cases afterwards, and they seem somewhat more likely than
LASH supervising attorneys to use a tenant style. 4 t But this cannot be the
whole story, for looking only at cases handled by supervising attorneys, we see
a marked change with A's arrival. Before period A, LASH attorneys used a
legalistic style in 64.7 percent of the seventeen cases for which we have style
data and a service style in an additional 17.6 percent of their cases. Beginning
with period A, LASH attorneys used a legalistic style in 42.9 percent of the
fourteen cases we could code and a service style in one additional case or 7.1
percent. Thus, these attorneys made tenant style pleas in only 17.6 percent of
their cases before A's arrival on the scene but in 50 percent of the cases that
they handled afterward.
One possible explanation for this change in representational style is that
the presence within the Authority of a full-time eviction specialist or other
changes concomitant with A's arrival meant that the Authority's eviction
47. AbOt a quairtCr of oir lawyer cases (lid not contain s,ficien t information to allow us to
identify attorney styles.
48. HAW.REV. STAT. §§ 91-I to 91-18 (1985).
49. During the last three periods LASH paralegals appeared in 31 cases for which we have
information on style. They employed a legalistic style 32.2% of the time, a service style 6.5% of the
time, and a tenant style 61.3% of the time. During this time LASH supervising attorneys handled 14
cases. They employed a legalistic style 42.9% of the time, a service stvle 7.1 % of the time (one case),
and a tenant style 50% of the time. l'rivate attorneys participated in 15 cases during the last three
periods. [heV used a legalistic style 33.3% of the time, a service stvle 26.7% of the time, and a
tenant style 46% of'the time. Befoire period A, ILASH supervising attorneys constituted almost all of'
the lawyer participants. l)uring this time 17 of the 21 lawyer cases foiwhich we have information on
style involved LASH supervising aiorneys, three involved LASH paralegals, and one involved a
private attorney. in one lawyer case in period A we do not know the lawyer type and in one period B
case we know te lawyer came from LASH bul we do not know if he was a supervising attornev or a
paralegal. in both these cases the attorney used a legalistic style. They are not included in the above
figtures.
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TABLE

6

STYLES OF REPRESENTATION

By

PERIOD*

PERIOD

1966-74
72.7%

1975-77
40.0%

1978-79
20.0%

A
33.3%

B
45.5%

C
30.0%

Total
41.0%

(8)

(2)

(1)

(10)

(10)

(3)

(34)

Service

-

40.0%
(2)

60.0%
(3)

16.7%
(5)

4.5%
(1)

10.0%
(1)

14.5%
(12)

Tenant

27.3%
(3)

20.0%
(1)

20.0%
(l)

50.0%
(15)

50.0%
(11)

60.0%
(6)

44.6%
(37)

11

5

5

30

22

10

83

LAWYER S-[YLE

Iegalistic

Total Cases
*

Number of cases in parentheses.
TABLE

7

STYLES OF REPRESENTATION

By

CAUSE OF ACTION

CAUSE OF ACTION

NP

Fals.

Guests

Pets

01

Misc.

Total

Legalistic

23.7%
(9)

40.0%
(4)

72.7%
(8)

55.6%
(5)

50.0%
(7)

100.0%
(1)

41.0%
(34)

Service

23.7%
(9)

-

9.1%
(1)

-

14.3%
(2)

--

14.5%
(12)

52.6%

60.0%

18.2%

44.4%

35.7%

(20)

(6)

(2)

(4)

(5)

38

10

11

9

14

LAWYER STYI.E

Tenant
Total Cases

*

44.6%
-

(37)
1

83

Number of cases in parentheses.

processes attended more closely to matters of legal form and so left less room
for legal challenges.5" Another possibility is that attorneys became more
accepting of the Authority's procedures. This may reflect both the Authority's
greater attention to legal form and the increasing number of cases that LASH
represented once the Authority's pace of evictions increased. More regular
representation may have allowed LASH's attorneys and paralegals to develop
5
working relationships with the Authority's hearing officer'.
50. Examination of changes over time in lawyer style, controlling for the cause of action,
indicates that the stvle changes we have identified cannot be explained by changes in the mix of case
ty)Ccs over time.

51. This does not explain the fact that private attorneys were legalistic in only a third of the
cases they handled, but since, with one exception, private attorneys are oniy involved in evictions
fi om period A on, we cannot establish an earlier private attorney baseline.
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Table 7 indicates that the tenant style was more common in non-payment
and falsification cases than in cases brought for other causes of action. This,
we hypothesize, is a function of the more or less open and shut nature of these
cases and the legitimacy of the rules they sanctioned. In non-payment cases
the tenant style was to promise to pay or, in the later periods, actually to pay
the rent owing. In falsification cases the usual tenant style was to argue that
reporting requirements had been misunderstood. Service style representation
is highest in non-payment cases because the services that lawyers were best
situated to perform involved aiding tenants in acquiring money or managing
their debts. The intermediate rate of tenant style representation in other
trouble cases and pet cases suggests that lawyers tried to excuse their client's
behavior ("the neighbors started the fight") or made promises of reform ("my
client will give her dog away") more often than they contested the legal
validity of the Authority's evidence or challenged the rule on which the
Authority relied.
If we contrast cases that had a lawyer only at the pre-hearing or hearing
stage with those that had a lawyer only on appeal, we find that the legalistic
and service styles were somewhat more common at the hearing. One of these
styles was used in fourteen of twenty-six cases that only had lawyers at the
hearing compared to twelve of thirty cases that only had representation on
appeal. This suggests that there may have been more room5 2 for legal
maneuvering to aid tenants at hearings than there was on appeal.
Finally, we can look at the relationship between legal representation,
lawyer style, and outcomes.

Table 8 takes a step in this direction.5 3

It

aggregates subjective judgments about whether attorneys affected case
outcomes 54 and relates this information to lawyer style. The Table only
52. In 12 of 16 cases in which a lawyer represented a tenant at both the hearing and on appeal,
the legalistic or service style was employed, as it was in seven of the 10 cases in which ihe lawyer's
involvement began after the appeal had been heard. T'he latter often involved taking the Authority
to court, for no official internal remedies remained. In both these situations service style
representation was less common than it was when representation was only at the hearing or only on
appeal. We are, of course, not talking about large nulmbeis of cases.
53. As we indicate in note 45. sulra, we have begun exploring, in a multivariate framework, tie
effects of having a lawyer on case outcomes. Here we simply stimmat'ie sti Ijectivejudgments, based
on case records, of whether lawyers made a diflterence in the cases of those they represented, and, if
so, whether the\, helped or hurt their clients. The miiltivariate analysis is not vet to the point where
we can sav whether what we are finding is consistent with what we report here.
54. Thesejudgments are tlhe first author's and based on often fragmentary case files. In about
20% of the cases no judgment could be reached because of insufficient information. We say that a
lawyer made a difference if the board's decision or the Authority's action on appeal or even afterward
seems to have responded to arguments that unrepi'eseitted tenants were not likely to have made. We
also say that representation made a diflerence if the lawyer made, and the Authority responded to, a
tenant style argument that the tenant probably would not have been able to make had she not had
legal help (as when a service-oriented attorney solves a welfare problem for the tenant, which
provides her with money to clear her rent debt) or that the Authority wotld hlave been unlikely to
respoid to had the argument not been made by a lawser. We say that a lawver did tot make a
difference where the result appears to be one which an unrepiesented tenant would have obtained.
If there is no special indication of a lawyer effect, We assume ihat, if the result is the routine board
disposilion fot cases of tflfat type at that time, here was no eflect. In some cases we are unsure about
whether i disposition is rouline or whether certain information should be taken as an indication of a

lawsci ell','t. Wc code liese

'ases

as cases in which the presence of an attorney "perhaps" had an
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includes information on cases in which the tenant was allowed to stay after the
hearing, appeal, or post-hearing plea. In twenty-nine attorney cases in which
the tenant was either evicted or vacated without a board decision, there is no
case in which it appears that a lawyer's actions denied the tenant a likely
victory, and there are only two cases in which the lawyer's representation is
such that it appears that the tenant might have been better off had she done
without it. In short, if our judgments are accurate, legal representation
virtually never hurt tenants. When represented tenants were evicted, one may
almost always conclude that they would have fared no better on their own.
Table 8 indicates that in twenty-three cases-or 4 1.8 percent of the cases
in which represented tenants were allowed to stay-we are reasonably
confident that they would have left or been evicted but for the aid they
received from counsel. In an additional fourteen cases-or 25.5 percent of
these cases-legal representation may have made a difference. In 32.7
percent of the cases it appears that the tenants would have been allowed to
stay whether or not they had had an attorney.
Not surprisingly, among the cases in which the tenant succeeded in
staying, lawyers were most likely to have made a difference when legalistic
arguments were advanced. These were arguments that required knowledge
that tenants did not have, so that when the board or Authority responded to
such an argument by allowing the tenant to stay, it seems likely that the
lawyer's presence was crucial to the Authority's decision. 5 5 This is not to say
that legalistic arguments are the most effective kinds of arguments that
lawyers make. Lawyers advanced legalistic arguments on behalf of about a
third of the tenants allowed to stay but made such arguments in 54.2 percent
(thirteen of twenty-four) of the stylistically classifiable cases in which the
tenant left or was evicted.
effect. But even when we code "Yes" or "No" in response to the question of whether a lawyer had an
effect, we are talking in probabilistic terms.
55. The difficult issue for coding is whether the decision to allow a tenant to stay was
overdetermined. Thus, if a non-payment tenant paid back all her rent and was allowed to stay by the
board after her lawyer made a legalistic argument, we would code the case as one in which the lawyer
made no difference. On the other hand, if as happened in one case, the tenant paid back her rent
after her appeal and the lawyer had to go to court to stop the eviction, we coded the case as one in
which the lawyer made a difference. If by objecting to a legally deficient notice the lawyer succeeded
in delaying an eviction action for several months during which time the tenant was able to secure
money to pay her rent, our coding of the case depended on what information we had about the
likelihood that the tenant would have come up with the money had there been no delay. In the
absence of information about these prospects, we treated such cases as cases in which the lawyer
perhaps made a difference. If the lawyer pretermitted the eviction process as when a lawyer objected
to the absence of a witness and the Authority cancelled a hearing without rescheduling it, we
assumed the lawyer made a difference even though we could not know what would have happened at
the hearing had it been held. In this sense, our estimate of when lawyers made a difference should be
taken as a maximum estimate. We are conservative in saying that lawyers had no effect. We are
similarly conservative in that we coded cases where the lawyer helped secure a conditional deferment
as cases in which the tenant stayed and the lawyer made a difference, even if the tenant subsequently
defaulted on conditions that had been set and vacated or was evicted. We did this because, despite
the fact that the tenant ultimately left housing, the lawyer helped the tenant secure a positive
outcome that she would not have secured on her own. Five of the 23 cases (21.7%) in which the
lawver made a difference fell into this category as did one of 14 cases in which the lawyer perhaps
made a difference.
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TABLE

8

AN EVALUATION OF WHETHER LAWYERS MAKE A DIFFERENCE

By

LAWYER STYLE*

DID LAWYER MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
LAWYER STYLE

Yes

Perhaps

No

Total

75.0%

15.0%

10.0%

100%

(15)

(3)

(2)

(20)

Service

50.0%

40.0%

10.0%

100%

Tenant

12.0%

28.0%

60.0%

100%

(3)

(7)

(15)

(25)

41.8%
(23)

25.5%
(14)

32.7%
(18)

100%
(55)

Legalistic

Total

*

(5)

(4)

(!)

(10)

Number of cases in parentheses.Includes only cases represented by a lawyer where tenant was

allowed to stay in housing.

The service style approach, like the legalistic style, appears to have been
often instrumental in aiding tenants allowed to stay. In only one of the ten
service style cases in which the tenant was allowed to stay are we reasonably
confident that the outcome would have been the same had the attorney not
been involved in the action, and in five of the ten cases it appears likely that
the outcome would have been different. In the remaining four cases it is
difficult to say whether the lawyer's presence was important. These were
cases in which the tenant might have accomplished for herself what her lawyer
provided, or in which the board might have let the tenant stay without the
extra guarantees the lawyer was able to offer. The service style is more
prevalent when tenants stay than when they leave. It was used in 16.9 percent
of the former cases and 8.3 percent of the latter.
Among the group of cases in which tenants are allowed to stay, the tenant
style is least likely to appear to have mattered. This too is not surprising
because tenants ordinarily make such arguments on their own behalf. Our
judgment was that 60 percent of the successes associated with tenant style
arguments involved situations in which unrepresented tenants commonly
made similar arguments to the same effect. In three cases, or 12 percent of
the total, it appeared that a tenant's argument would not have succeeded
where a lawyer's argument did. For example, after a tenant's appeal had been
rejected, one lawyer wrote a personal letter to an Authority official raising
what he acknowledged were non-legal considerations, and the tenant was
given a second chance. Seven cases were difficult to classify because, while
the arguments were of a kind a tenant might have made, it was not clear that
the board or the Authority would have bought the arguments had they not
been made by an attorney. For example, in arguing that a tenant's debts
would not interfere with future rent payments, an attorney might note
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specifically how each debt could be managed while a tenant might simply
assert that they could be handled. In the later time periods it is difficult to say
whether a board that accepted the attorney's argument would have been
satisfied with the tenant's vaguer assertion. Had the case arisen in 1970,
however, it would have been clear that the representation made no difference
and the case would have been coded this way.
Overall, the tenant style argument is relatively successful. It accounts for
47.5 percent of the arguments advanced in cases in which tenants were
allowed to stay but only 37.5 percent of the arguments in cases in which
tenants left or were evicted. However, this largely reflects the availability of
this argument whenever a non-payment tenant paid back her rent debt, and
the Authority's general willingness to allow tenants to stay in these
circumstances.
These data indicate that lawyers can make a difference in informal
tribunals like the public housing eviction board we have examined. However,
we started with 1268 cases. In only twenty-three cases, or 1.8 percent of the
total, does it appear that the presence of an attorney helped the tenant, and in
only an additional 1. 1 percent of the cases do we feel that we cannot exclude
that possibility. What do these figures mean? If we extrapolate from the data
we have to 100 percent representation, it appears that lawyers would have
aided tenants about 29 percent of the time, and they would perhaps have aided
them in an additional 18 percent of the cases. 56 These figures suggest that
despite the informality of the Authority's eviction process, many tenants
would have fared better had they been able to retain legal counsel. But one
cannot extrapolate from the group of tenants who had attorneys to the group
of unrepresented tenants in this fashion. We are confident that the number of
unrepresented tenants in our sample who would have been helped by an
attorney does not approach 47 percent or even 29 percent of the total number
of tenants who lacked counsel.
Consider first that a majority of unrepresented tenants have, over the
years, prevailed before the board or on appeal, and so did not need an
attorney to secure a favorable outcome. Second, recall that another
substantial group-amounting to more than 8 percent of the total-vacated
before the first hearing. 5 7 Many of these are likely to have had hopeless cases.

Third, of those who were evicted at the first hearing and then vacated or
unsuccessfully appealed, about 70 percent were charged with non-payment of
56. We extrapolated by assuming that when a tenant stayed and we could not determine
whether a lawyer had made a difference, the probability that the lawver made a difference was 4 1.8%
and the probability that the lawyer might, perhaps, have made a difference was 25.5%. See Table 8.
We then calculated the number of additional cases that these percentages represented, added these
numbers to the totals for the "yes'" and "perhaps" cases in Table 8 and divided by 107, the total
number of lawser cases for which we had outcome information. For the reasons mentioned in note
55, this figure is a maximum estimate. Our coding conventions may be added to the list of reasons
given in the text below for concluding that this extrapolation is a substantial overestimate of the
degree to which lawyers might have helped the group of unrepresented tenants.
57. 1Tenants who attend board hearings and are eventually evicted or vacate constitute about
20% of the docket cases in our sample.
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rent. Except where attorneys might have identified sources of funds that the
tenants could not have acquired on their own, legal representation is unlikely
to have helped these tenants. Fourth, attorneys are not always successful.
Represented tenants are evicted about a third of the time, and even when
represented tenants stay, about 36 percent of the time the representation
appears to have made no difference 5 8 and in another quarter of the cases it
may not have been crucial. Fifth and most important, represented cases have
been selected by the tenants involved, and often by the attorneys as well, as
cases in which a lawyer's presence seemed useful. Thus, the unrepresented
tenants would not have found lawyers as useful as did those who in fact
acquired them. While we cannot know the proportion of cases that would
have turned out differently if all tenants had lawyers, that proportion may well
5
be quite small. '9
VIII
CHANGES OVER TIME

One recurring theme in the data we have presented is that the relationship
of attorneys to the eviction process changed over time. We can better
understand these changes with information gleaned from case records and
interviews that we cannot quantify. The story these materials allow us to tell
largely concerns legal aid's involvement with the Authority, for private
attorneys were rarely involved with evictions until period A, when the
transformation of the Authority's procedures and of lawyers' reactions to
them was well under way. When private attorneys did get involved, their ways
of representing tenants were, so far as we can determine, not very different
from that of their legal aid counterparts, but one sees proportionately more
private attorney cases in which representation appears to be confined to one
or two letters or phone calls.

58. This figure is not inconsistent with lable 8, for it includes cases for which we have no style
information.
59. Note also that the Authority can react to steps that tenants take to avoid eviction. If
represented tenants often prevailed at hearings, the Authority would probably have taken steps to
diminish their success rate unless that success were due to non-payment tenants repaying their rent.
Some of the changes the Authority secured in the statute establishing the board and in its own rules
and regulations were almost certainly designed in part to make its eviction systen less vulnerable to
legal challenge and thereby reduce the success rate of legalistic arguments.
Although for this reason and those we discuss in the text it is unlikely that more widespread
representation would have made a great difference in the outcomes tenants received, preliminary
examination of data that we do not present here suggests that there is one difference that is strongly
associated with legal representation: delay. Cases with lawyers take longer to resolve than those
without them. When lawyers get involved in eviction action, continuances are almost always
requested and are usually granted. Delavs mav also occur when negotiation is ongoing. Delay is
often valuable for tenants because it gives them more time in low-rent public housing and more time
to search flor oiher accommodations.
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THE ATTORNEY'S PERSPECTIVE:

1966-74

The federally funded legal aid program, LASH, arrived in Hawaii in 1967
as part of the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty. By 1970 the
Authority was well aware of LASH, as LASH attorneys took on the cases of a
few tenants threatened with eviction and worked with other public housing
tenants to organize a tenants' union and to lobby for the inclusion of two
tenants on the eviction board. LASH's organizing efforts quickly bore fruit,
for the Authority's staff encouraged rather than resisted their initiatives. As
the first LASH director of law reform recalls:
They [the head of the Authoritv and his official superior, the head of the Department
of Social Services] were virtually impossible to organize against because they were
completely affable and very friendly ...very reasonable.

In contrast to this evaluation of the Authority's leadership are the
recollections that various LASH attorneys who handled cases between 1969
and 1974 had of the eviction board and its hearing process. One attorney,
when asked about the Authority's eviction process and the quality of the
eviction board, remarked:
[Ilt was a nightmare. There wasn't any due process; there was no notion that people

were allowed to have due process ....

[IT]he [eviction board] chairman ... was so

angry att us for attempting to assert anybody's rights because it had never happened
before. 0

Another attorney, when asked about due process during this period replied,
"There wasn't any." A third, who at one time was the head of LASH,
identified as major due process problems during 1974-75, "[n]otice, right to
representation, types of enforcement of federal regs." When asked what legal
aid attorneys thought of the board from a pure fairness standpoint, he replied
that it was characterized by "lack of professionalism [and] knowledge," but
noted that the board improved toward the end of his tenure. In fact, at the
start of this director's tenure tenants charged with non-payment were virtually
never evicted at initial hearings, but by the end of this lawyer's tenure they
were evicted about one-quarter of the time."' Tenants, in short, did better
during the "nightmare" period than they were ever to do again.
Moreover, it is not clear that the Authority's eviction process during this
period should be labeled a nightmare from a due process perspective. This
characterization appears to reflect the standpoint of a lawyer with an
expansive view of due process and an expectation of something like
courtroom procedure more than it does the state of the law. The board's
procedures, it appears, always met the minimum requisites of due process as
60. The project managers regarded this chairman with equal disapproval. To them he was a
"bleeding heart" who always sided with the tenant.
61. [he proportion of evictions in cases brought for reasons other than non-paymem did
decrease somewhat during this director's tenure, but there were so few such cases that not much can
be made of this.

Page 135: Autumnn 1988]

LAWYERS AND INFORMAL JUSTICE

enunciated in the leading opinions of the day." 2 Tenants received notice of
the Authority's charges; they had a right to counsel; they could hear the case
against them; they could introduce evidence; they could cross-examine
witnesses; and they had the benefit of an independent decisionmaker that was
not only purportedly neutral but was in fact often sympathetic to their needs
and concerns. In the welfare area due process has not required more.
Indeed, while LASH attorneys do not recall the pre-1975 eviction board with
fondness, they agree that when it came to evictions, public housing tenants
were better off than their counterparts in private housing who faced judicial
summary eviction. One reason they give for the small number of public
housing cases that LASH handled during this period is that the situation of
impoverished tenants in private housing was far more desperate.
The interesting question is why these lawyers so misevaluated the
implications of the board's informality for the interests of the client
population they wished to protect. We believe there are several reasons. The
first is that LASH attorneys appeared before the board only rarely. Since they
were not repeat players, they did not appreciate the overall pattern of board
decisionmaking. The second is that LASH attorneys appeared in tenantselected actions. Thus, tenants who had more complex cases, who were
standing on issues of principle,': or who had the greatest fear of being
evicted-in short tenants charged with offenses other than non-paymentwere more likely than other tenants to be represented by legal aid. These
were the tenants who were most likely to be evicted during the period 196674 regardless of representation. Had LASH attorneys represented a random
sample of tenants brought before the board during this period, they might
have recognized the generally lenient pattern of board dispositions.64 The
third reason is that the LASH attorneys were professionally trained to see
certain features as crucial to fair adjudication.65 The absence of these features
triggered in the professionally trained mind the conclusion that the board was
unfair. Particularly important was the absence of familiar procedural rules
and the frustration this absence engendered.
The following interchange, for example, comes from a case that the board
heard in 1969. It shows a LASH attorney attempting to impose a legalistic
model-rules of evidence-on the board's proceedings. The case involved a
59-year-old woman, Mrs. 1Ylwho because of a disability had been placed in a
high-rise apartment building for the elderly. Her drinking, cursing, and
frequent male guests led to a series of complaints by the neighbors and
62. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of
Durham. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
63. These seem to have been true largely in "pet" actions. One tenant, for example, had given
his dog away before the board hearing, but did not reveal this to the board until after his hearing had
concluded and the board had voted to evict him.
64. This explains why the LASH attorneys and the project managers could be equally harsh in
their judgment of the board during this period. Managerial judgments were based on large samples
of board actions in which non-payment cases predominated.
65. Even if these features were not essential to fair adjudication, thev were for lawyers symbolic
cues of fairness. Cf E. GOFFMAN, FRA IE AN.StIS ch. 3 (1979) (discussing the concept of keying).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 5 1: No. 4

ultimately to an attempt to evict her. Because the tenant had a LASH attorney
who signaled through pretrial motions his intent to proceed legalistically, the
Authority arranged to have the state assign it a Deputy Attorney General
("DAG") for the hearing.(" At one point the DAG attempted to introduce
records of complaints the project manager had received about the tenant.
The DAG, too, had the rules of evidence in mind. Although her
understanding of what they entailed was not as good as her opponent's, she
prevailed because the board was informal; its non-lawyer chair was both
unwilling and incapable of making a legal ruling on the matter." 7 The
following is a portion of a dialogue that occupied more than three legal-size
transcript pages. It began with the DAG questioning the project manager and
establishing that certain records he had with him were records of complaints
he had received about the tenant.
DAG:
MANAGER:
DAG:

LASH:

DAG:

LASH:

Are the entries made in the regular course of business
in the office?
Yes, they are.
I submit for evidence, Mr. Chairman, the records in
the file of Mrs. Y, being the records of [project],
showing the daily entries or the entries made in
respect to Mrs. .
Mr. Chairman, I've got some problems here. May I
ask the purpose for which the records are being
submitted?
We wish to show the history and complaints made and
entered into by [project] and I have here Section 6-225 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes and I'll give you a
copy of the Section of the Statutes pertaining to
business records as being an exception to the hearsay
rules.
Mr. Chairman, I don't have any difficulty with facts
that those records are what Mr. [Manager] and his
staff have written down and if it is admitted for the
purpose of showing there have been complaints, I
don't have any difficulty with that. I would like to be
very clear that these records should not be taken as a
reference to indicate the truth or falsity of anything in
any complaint.

66. We have no way of knowing whether the Authority would have sought to present its case
through an attorney if the LASH attorney's pretrial behavior had been confined to informal requests
for information and not included formal motions to dismiss, to inspect evidence, and for a more
definite statement of the charges.
67. In fact the DAG should have prevailed because the eviction board was not bound by judicial
rules of evidence. But the debate proceeds-except for one brief moment-as if these rules should
be followed.
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I have another difficulty and that is it is not grounds
for eviction, that there have been complaints. A
person might only be evicted by what the person does,
otherwise the person with an animus against a tenant
could call every other name about a friend and you'll
get a stack of complaints and be up for eviction.
CHAIR:

DAG:

MANAGER:
LASH:

DAG:

LASH:

DAG:

LASH:

DAG:

The Board will be broad-minded in that if you will just
accept this, you will have no further objections for
Exhibit A and then whatever any decision that is made
based on our complaint, we will make it known. We
will accept this as Exhibit A.
Mr. Chairman, we submit that these records are an
exception to the hearsay rules pursuant to Section 622-5, Hawaii Revised Statutes as being entered in the
duty records in the regular course of business. Mr.
[Manager], would you please read to the Board the
entry for April 2, 1969, in the records of the [project]?
On April 2, 1969 ....
Mr. Chairman, let me inquire, if I may, why this is
being read to the Board. Is it for the purpose of
showing the truth of the matter contained in it?
Mr. [LASH], we're not saying that these matters are
true. We are saying that these complaints have been
made and that is an exception to the hearsay rules.
Mr. Chairman, we're willing to stipulate that
complaints have been made and if somebody is going
to count the complaints we'll be willing to stipulate
the number of the complaints that have been made
but it seems to me that there is a great danger of
prejudicing the Board against [Mrs. 1] unfairly by
reading into evidence complaints that are not testified
to by human beings, and we've experienced the
matter. Part of the objections is based on the
Administrative Procedure Act which was discussed
earlier and that is one of the reasons why I wanted to
bring it up earlier which guarantees to tenants the
right to cross-examine witnesses against them.
Mr. [LASH], the Administrative Procedure Act further
states under Section 91-10 of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes that oral or documentary evidence may be
received.
Mr. Chairman as to right, the counsel is right, I don't
like to sound like a lawyer, it is not reversible error for
you to see and read bad evidence. However ...
I object to your usage of the word bad evidence.
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LASH:

All right, otherwise in evidence and admissible in
court. It is not reversible error as you can see. I really ,

DAG:

Mr. [LASH], I must remind you that this is an
exception to the hearsay rules. This is perfectly
admissible in the court of law. In any court it would
be perfectly admissible as being a business entry.
It is admissible for the purpose of showing that a
complaint has been made. It is not admissible for the
purpose of showing the truth or falsity of the
complaint.

LASH:

[And so on for another two pages]
The chairman of the board hardly got a word in edgewise in this
discussion-and no wonder. He was not a lawyer, and there was no way he
could resolve the dispute at the level at which the attorneys were going at each.
other. This must have been particularly frustrating for the LASH attorney
who was correct in his analysis of the hearsay rule. If the evidence of the
complaints were offered simply to show that complaints were made, they were
not barred by the hearsay rule, and there was no reason to read the
complaints to the tribunal."8 If they were offered for their truth, they did not,
despite the DAG's legal argument, qualify as business records because the
declarants were under no business duty when they made them, and so they
should not have been admitted at all if the ordinary rules of evidence applied.
However, as the LASH attorney agreed in a concession that was quickly lost in
further wrangling about the hearsay rule, the board was not bound by judicial
rules of evidence and so could listen to this "bad evidence" if it wished.
The hearing proceeded for sixty-one transcript pages, longer than some
criminal trials. The lawyers proceeded like lawyers. Witnesses were called,
examined, and cross-examined. Objections were made and argued.
Ultimately the board voted to evict. LASH did not appeal to either the
Authority or a court, and the tenant moved out almost three weeks before the
board's deadline.
As a legal case, this one was a loser. The tenant was clearly guilty of
behavior that created disturbances in violation of the lease provisions, and the
LASH attorney knew it. Indeed, the theme that emerges from his
examination of the witnesses is that the problems that the Authority cited
stemmed from the fact that his client, an active and cantankerous woman of
fifty-nine, had been misplaced in a project of quiet-seeking retirees, many of
whom were in their seventies or eighties." ' The solution the LASH attorney
68.
1ihe records reporting the complaints would be hearsay; but, as the LASH attorney
conceded, they would be admissible to show that a particular number of complaints had been
received if that were relevant.
69. She had qualified for admission to this project, although she had not met the usual age
threshold, because she met a disability standard.
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wanted was clear-he wanted his client transferred to an ordinary low-income
project.
This indeed is the strategy most likely to have worked. But by attempting
to implement it in a trial-type context, the LASH attorney minimized the
chance that he would get his message across. For example, one incident that
the Authority cited involved an occasion when Mrs. Y cursed a 79-year-old
woman, Mrs. C, in a dispute over who should have use of a clothes dryer. After
briefly reviewing the incident the cross-examination proceeded:
Mrs. C, you never lived in public housing before this,
have you?
Mrs. C:
No.
LASH:
You lived in a private home, I think.
Mrs. C:
I lived in another apartment house ....
LASH:
And you never had any experience with public
housing before?
Mrs. C:
No.
LASH:
And you didn't have any friends living in low-income
public housing, I take it?
Mrs. C:
No, first time I ....
LASH:
So, I assume that with your background and all, you're
not used to hearing loud [indecipherable] things and
great disturbances?
Mrs. C:
No, I didn't.
At this point there was an argument about the relevance of this line of
questioning, and the Supervising Public Housing Manager ("SPHM") who
was present interjected that in his experience on the projects the use of vulgar
language in public housing was rare. Then Mrs. C, who apparently thought
her veracity was being questioned interjected, "I have to tell the truth," and
the LASH attorney who may have been confused by the spontaneous
witnessing of the SPHM said he had missed his observation, which gave the
SPHM the chance to repeat his remarks in more detail:
LASH:

SPHM:

I stated that in all my experience with public housing
in the low income project, I very seldom heard words
used in public as presented by witnesses here, and this
I can state as a matter of fact. Well, we may have
heard lots of "damn" and some of the "F" words, but
some of the words that were used, they made
implications that because this is in the public housing
low-rent projects that the words are commonly used

LASH:

Mr. Chairman, I have a witness who is a tenant in
public housing who'd like to make comments later, if
we can.
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On this note the cross-examination of Mrs. C ended. The witness the
LASH attorney promised was never produced, for as the hearing dragged on
and the board began to appear as if it was impatient and ready to render a
verdict, Mrs. I's attorney simply stated that he had available a witness who
would testify that profanity is quite common in low-income projects and
vulgarisms are not exceptional or shocking. The witness was not presented.
But the LASH attorney misunderstood the issues. The dispute was not
over whether as a matter of fact profanity is common in low-income public
housing. It was over whether Mrs. Y should be allowed to stay in housing
either at the elderly project or in some other low-income development. The
board in assessing Mrs. I's moral fitness-which is really what they were
doing-was not likely to be greatly moved by whether the targets of her
vulgarity in the elderly project came from more middle-class backgrounds (a
point the LASH attorney tried to make in questioning several tenant
witnesses) and so were more likely to be offended by profanity than were
tenants from ordinary low-income projects.
Similarly, the following dialogue at the close of Mrs. I's direct examination
was unlikely to make the case for transferring her rather than evicting.
LASH:
MRS. Y:

LASH:
MRS. Y:

Mrs. Y is [project] a dull place?
Looks like a funeral parlor most of the time. The
people are elderly, and they like to make fun that I
have a crooked leg, what kind of slippers you wear, if
you're a little younger they make fun of the color of
my lipstick, or I tint my hair, or how I comb or dress.
Do you believe that you would be happier in a housing
project with younger people?
Oh yes, I think so very much. That place is too dull
for me, looks like a funeral parlor to me. If they'd
leave me alone it would be all right ....

LASH:
MRS. V:

They don't by and large enjoy your sense of humor I
take it?
Oh yes, not at all, but I like everybody and I would say
good morning or good afternoon ....

LASH:

No further questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Moreover, since both the LASH attorney and the DAG were proceeding
legalistically, the direct examination opened the door to a cross-examination
as to credibility that revealed that Mrs. Y had an arrest record extending back
to 1933, which included charges of threatening police, carrying a gun,
prostitution, trespassing, and drunk and disorderly conduct.
Ironically, the LASH attorney did not employ his best opportunity to
argue that Mrs. I's elderly neighbors were unduly sensitive and that a transfer
was the appropriate resolution, for when he was invited to make a closing
statement, he responded, "I suspect we talked enough Mr. Chairman."
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X
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The LASH attorney went wrong at the outset of the case when he signaled
his intention to treat the eviction action as a quasi-criminal legal proceeding
by filing motions to dismiss, for a more definite statement of the Authority's
charges, and for inspection of documentary evidence in the Authority's
possession. These motions-indeed the very fact of proceeding by motion
rather than with an informal phone call-indicated to the Authority that the
case would be both aggressively and legalistically contested; they perhaps
induced the Authority to proceed by attorney since the motions had to be
referred to an attorney, and they may have led the Authority to present more
witnesses than would ordinarily have testified in a case like this.
What the attorney should have done was to attempt to negotiate a transfer
before the meeting. If this failed, he should have handled the case in a lowkey fashion. Cross-examination of the Authority's witnesses should have been
limited to an attempt to emphasize the limited number of disturbances that
Mrs. Y was reported to have caused. On direct examination Mrs. Y should not
have been narrowly confined. Rather, she should have told a story in which
she explained away those incidents that could be explained, apologized for
those that could not, promised not to repeat her behavior in the future, and
asked for a transfer to a low-rise, low-income unit in which she would not be
living in such close proximity to her neighbors. Ideally, the lawyer would, in
addition, have had Mrs. Y enter an alcoholism treatment program or start
attending Alcoholics Anonymous and would have had a witness present to
testify to this effort at self-improvement.
In short, the attorney could have most helped his client by coaching her so
that she behaved as a savvy tenant would, with or without legal counsel. But
the attorney had no idea how a savvy tenant would act because he was not a
repeat player before the eviction board-this was his first case. Thus, he drew
on the repertoire of moves with which he was most familiar-the moves that
characterize a contested criminal case. He was probably aware that these
moves were poorly suited to the facts of his case and the tribunal hearing it,
but he knew of no other way to proceed.
We cannot, of course, know that the approach of a savvy tenant would
have been any more successful than the trial-type approach that the LASH
attorney used. Indeed, if the case arose today we could be fairly certain that
the final result would have been the same-an order of eviction. However the
1969 board that heard the case of Mrs. Y frequently found for tenants, and a
repentant Mrs. Y might have moved it to give her a second chance,
particularly if the Authority could have arranged a transfer which would have
meant that she would no longer bother those who had complained about her.
Because board hearings are seldom transcribed, we cannot know how
frequently lawyers make technical evidentiary objections like those made by
the LASH attorney in Mrs. 's case. Comments from board members indicate
that this trial-type mode of contesting eviction occurs occasionally, but,
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especially in recent years, a more cooperative expository stance
predominates. This is borne out by summary case decisions that indicate that
lawyers most often simply make or support tenant excuses or offer plans to
remedy an admitted wrong. Thus, we see in Table 6 that since about 1980,
lawyers are more likely to take a tenant style approach than a legalistic
approach to board hearings. Moreover, the kind of legalism we see in Mrs. I's
case-an attempt to impose court-like ways of proceeding on board
hearings-is not the only or even the usual way that lawyers act legalistically.
Most legalistic arguments do not concern the conduct of the hearings but
instead focus on interpretations of adequate cause for eviction or on
procedural lapses such as an Authority failure to provide a tenant with
7
adequate notice.

1

We did, however, see the transcript for one case in the 1980's that looked
very much like the case of Mrs. Y in the evidentiary wrangling that occurred
throughout. The tenant was a Samoan chief who faced eviction because of the
violent behavior of his grown son. He was represented by a private attorney
who was an alumnus of LASH but who had never handled public housing
evictions. A long-time board member recalled this case in explaining his
judgment that lawyers more often hurt tenants than help them:
Within the first 30 minutes that [tenant's] attorney had the ability to irritate evervbodv
on the board and piss them off. In other words, and right away, they were anti-tenant.
He created that atmosphere. Now, how did he do that, I don't know; if he intended to
7
do that, I don't know. But he succeeded admirably. I

The sentiment expressed by this board member-that lawyers more often
hurt than helped tenants-was shared by most board members. 72 A few,
however, thought that, on balance, lawyers aided tenants by forcing the board
to "toe the line."

70. \'ithout transcripts we cannot be certain that evidentiary disputes are absent from man'l'
lawver-attended hearings. However, most of them have no witnesses apart from the tenant and
project manager: the hearing summaries prepared bv the board's secretary mention legal arguments
made on behalf of tenants but rarely if ever note evidentiary objections; and the case files seldom
include formal legal motions or expressions of lawverlv concern about the Authority's evidentiary
and hearing procedure, although these are found in the files of several cases arising in the early
197 0's.
71. Except as otherwise indicated, the quotations in this article are drawn from interviews
conducted by the first author in Honolulu, Hawaii, during the summer of 1987. The interviews were
either face to face or over the telephone. All interviews were tape-recorded, and transcribed. Thus,
except for the elilnination of fillers like "tuh'" and the insertion of punctation marks, the quotations
reproduce rather than paraphrase informants' remarks. Interviewees' names are not reported
because the interviewees were told their names would not be used.
72. The judgment of some board members who felt this way may have been distorted by their
experience with a man who had represented several Samoan tenants brought before the board. I'his
man, a public housing tenant, Samoan chief, and self-appointed defender of Samoan interests, rook a
legalistic approach when defending his fellow tenants. A number of board members thought he was
a lawyer, but lie was not. His defenses were legally unsound, and, from a legal point of view, often
bordered on the absurd. He also appealed a number of adverse board decisions to the circuit court,
but because lie never followed through on the appeals, the cases were always dismissed. The cases
he handled are not coded as "lawyer cases" in our data.

Page 135: Autumn 1988]

LAWYERS AND INFORMAL JUSTICE

Regardless of their global judgments, most board members would
probably share the views of one tenant board member about when attorneys
did help:
Well, I found that the lawyers who admitted that the tenant was wrong and had a
formula or plan that the tenant would be agreeing by, that it would do. That was the
most productive for the tenant. But when we had to argue about the circumstantial
evidence and we had to argue about many other things then, you know, it became just
mind boggling.

In short, as far as the board members were concerned, attorneys were
most helpful when they proceeded not legalistically but from a problemsolving perspective. This involved making admissions, excuses, and promises
similar to those that unrepresented tenants often made. But the excuses and
promises of represented tenants may have had more credibility than those of
unrepresented tenants. Not only was a lawyer vouching for the tenant's
position, but the lawyer might have mustered others-like a social worker-to
vouch for a tenant's excuse or second her promises, or the lawyer might have
made arrangements that helped to clear up a past problem or to guarantee
future performance.
Lawyers often used the tenant style, either alone or as a component of the
service style, when the problem giving rise to the eviction had either been
cured before the hearing or, in all likelihood, would be cured shortly
thereafter. Non-payment cases commonly followed this model since the
entire debt might be paid before the hearing or a source of funds to pay the
debt could often be identified. Tenant style arguments were also used in
cases like Mrs. 's where it was possible to identify an outcome like a transfer
which responded to the Authority's concerns while allowing the tenant to
remain in housing. In any of these circumstances the lawyer might try to
persuade the Authority to cancel the eviction hearing as unnecessary. Until
recent years, hearings were often cancelled, but it appears that it was the
tenant's action-most commonly the payment of a rent debt-rather than the
presence of an attorney that mattered. With respect to the terms of their
continued occupancy, tenants seldom did better by settling "out of court"
7
than they would have done had they appeared before the board. t
73. While tenants who settled before the hearing seldom achieved better outcomes than those
the board would have imposed, there were other advantages to pre-hearing dispositions. When
hearings were cancelled tenants avoided the stress of a hearing, the prolonged subjective fear of
eviction, and the need to take time off from work or other activities to attend the hearing. Also, if
they subsequently defaulted on the terms of the agreement and were brought up for eviction, the
board would not have seen them before, and so they may have been more likely to receive a lenient
disposition.
For a brief while recently, there was a more concrete gain to be derived from having a hearing
dropped inia non-payment case, for the board began putting zero-balance, non-payment tenants who
appeared before it on conditions. See sipra note 16, for example. This not only imposed a
verification requirement, seeinfra note 74, on the next six months of rent payments but made it likely
that even a slight delay in timely rental payments would result in eviction. Within a few years after
this distinction arose between zero-balance tenants whose cases proceeded to hearings and those
whose hearings were cancelled, it disappeared as the Authority adopted a policy of routinely bringing
zero-balance tenants to a hearing. Thus, by 1987, pre-hearing settlements in non-payment cases
were largely a thing of the past.
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XI
CAPITULATORY JUSTICE

Settling matters out of court is familiar to lawyers who dispose of most
cases on a negotiated pretrial basis. Not surprisingly, the Authority's records
contain instances in which lawyers negotiated settlements after some
discussion with the Authority about plausible disposition of a case. One also
sees cases where attempts to settle got nowhere. For example, although the
available records of Mrs. I's case provide no evidence of any pretrial
negotiation, it is possible that her lawyer tried to persuade the Authority
before the hearing to transfer rather than evict her. In a few cases negotiated
compromises of this sort were reached. Ordinarily, however, pretrial
settlements involved complete capitulation to the Authority.
In non-payment cases, for example, which constituted close to threequarters of the eviction docket, pre-hearing dismissals usually occurred only
after the tenant paid all or a substantial portion of the amount owing. In the
Authority's records we did not encounter settlements for so many cents on
the dollar. In some behavior cases, like pet cases, the tenant similarly had to
comply in full with the Authority's demands to avoid a hearing. In other
behavior cases, like those involving fighting or the fraudulent concealment of
income, the situation was usually so egregious before the Authority decided to
evict that the Authority was unwilling to entertain any solutions that would
allow the tenants to remain in housing. In a few instances it appeared that a
lawyer may have regarded the attainment of a negotiated settlement as an end
in itself, for there were several cases in which formal documents were signed
whereby the Authority agreed to drop charges or to refrain from securing a
writ of possession in exchange for the tenant's agreement to move by a
specific date, often a date no later than the earliest date that the Authority
could have forced the tenant to move had the tenant exhausted all her legal
rights.
There are several reasons why capitulatory rather than negotiated justice
characterizes most eviction cases that settle without hearings. First, the
tenant's liability is usually clear. In non-payment cases there is never a
dispute about the existence of the rent debt that provides the legal basis for
eviction. In other cases the Authority's evidence of wrongdoing is usually
overwhelming, although occasionally the tenant may have a plausible defense
of misunderstanding or lack of responsibility. The one-sided nature of the
evidence ordinarily means that there is seldom much uncertainty about the
legal situation, and there is usually little uncertainty about what the eviction
board will do. While the board has disposed of similar cases in very different
ways at different times, at any given time the board's dispositions have been
largely predictable from the facts of the particular case. Moreover, in the
early 1970's, when the board's dispositions were most lenient, the Authority's
advocate before the board did not take an adversarial stance but was content
to let the board do as it wished. He had no concern for his "batting average,"
for he did not feel that he or the Authority was hurt by board decisions to
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defer. Thus, even when tenants had a good chance of securing a favorable
disposition from the board, they could wield few incentives that might induce
the Authority to prefer a less than complete victory to a board solution. The
result was that tenants either gave the Authority a complete victory by curing
the problem or moving out, or they proceeded to a board hearing. Even when
tenants were represented, hearings were unlikely to be pretermitted by
compromise solutions.
A second reason why we do not see the Authority offering significant
concessions to lawyers willing to negotiate is that from the Authority's
perspective hearings are cheap. The board members are volunteers who
receive only a token payment of $10.00 a member per meeting plus travel
expenses. The staff time that the hearing phase of the eviction process
demands is not great, and no use of the staff time that would be saved by
cancelling an occasional eviction hearing is important enough to justify
concessions to tenants who have violated their lease obligations.
Finally, the lawyers and paralegals who represent Authority tenants
generally accept the private landlord-tenant model that underlies public
housing. While these attorneys would no doubt accept concessions if these
could be wrung from the Authority through negotiation, they do not regard
the Authority's insistence on capitulation rather than compromise as unjust.
For example, between 1980 and 1987 the Authority's attitude in non-payment
cases shifted from a willingness to negotiate time payment schedules before
or during hearings to insistence on a hearing even when the subpoena had
triggered payment of the entire debt. Moreover, at that hearing the Authority
began demanding immediate eviction unless the debt had been cleared, in
which case a conditional deferment was acceptable.7 4 LASH's attorneys and
paralegals were aware of these changes and of the fact that the board
invariably complied with the Authority's wishes, but they had no strong
feelings about it. The change of policy from their point of view was within the
Authority's rights. Consequently, by 1987, LASH usually refused to represent
non-payment tenants before the board because it did not wish to invest
resources in cases that were open and shut.
Non-payment tenants who sought LASH's help received advice instead.
One paralegal who had dealt with a number of public housing tenants over
the years paraphrased what he told those behind on their rent:
I always advise my tenants to pay off delinquent rent. If for nothing else than to
convince them, remember now, if you don't pay)you are bound to get evicted. I try to
convince them that with a big family like yours, you are going to have a very difficult
time finding housing on the outside .... I really impress upon them that at all costs it
pays for them to pay their rent, it is one thing that they had better do and keep

74. These deferrals of eviction orders were not conditioned on time payments to clear a debt
since no debt existed. Instead, the usual conditions were that the rent be paid on time during the
succeeding six months and that each payment be verified. Verification consisted of bringing the

receipt for rent deposited at a bank to the project oflice by the rental due date. This enabled the
project manager to learn whether the condition of time payments had been met before the computer
printout of bank payments was received.
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current, or they are going to get evicted. Other debts, you know, at least they are not
going to lose the roof over their head ....

This tenant advocate's remarks could have been made by a project
manager addressing a tenant behind in her rent and are very much like the
moralistic lectures that some board members have given tenants.
XII
PROCESS LEGALISM

Mrs. I's case illustrated one kind of legalism, but most of the behavior we
coded as legalistic does not involve an attempt to proceed before the board as
if before a court. Rather, it involves legal objections to aspects of the eviction
process. Such objections have taken two forms. One form challenges the
fundamental legitimacy of the eviction process and the board's role in it. The
second points to particular procedural defects, often of a technical nature, in
the way the Authority has initiated or prosecuted a case. The first
characterized a number of cases brought in the early 1970's and culminated in
a lawsuit that for much of 1977 brought evictions almost to a standstill. 75 The
second, which was found occasionally before 1977, has since that time
characterized most legalistic responses to board action. If the Authority's
procedural machinery breaks down and a tenant does not receive timely
notice of a hearing, or a lease violation is improperly cited or there is some
similar deficiency, lawyers can almost always get an action dismissed; and it
seems that such cases are often not refiled.
LASH lawyers from the start were uncomfortable with eviction board
procedures. We saw this in the remarks of the attorney who called board
procedures a nightmare and in the conduct of Mrs. I's case as well. Thus, in
our earliest period the LASH response to informality was to seek to formalize
board procedures. Attorneys felt that both the rules establishing the board
and the board's ways of proceeding were too vague to give the guidance that
proper legal representation and due process required. In 1972, for example,
a LASH attorney who entered the picture only after the board had evicted his
client for trouble behavior sought a copy of the Authority's rules and
regulations regarding appeals. He appeared genuinely shocked to learn from
the DAG to whom his letter had been referred that the Authority had no
administrative rules regarding appeal because it felt that the state law
(Chapter 360) establishing the eviction board was clear and sufficient. The
attorney responded to the DAG's letter conveying this news by questioning
the legitimacy of the eviction board on the ground that although it was
authorized by state law the Authority had not established the board by rules
enacted under the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act. 7" He then wrote:
75. This case was Tileia v. Chang, Civ. No. 75-0107 (D. Haw. filed Apr. 16, 1975).
76. The lawyer's claim appears to have been that even though state law explicitly allowed the
Authority to process evictions through an eviction board and specified basic conditions that the
board and the Authority were required to meet, the Authority, as a state administrative agency, had
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Even assuming the existence of authority for the eviction board, appeal could not be
undertaken. As you indicate, HRS 360 seems specific regarding rules governing such
proceedings. Assuming, arguendo, that recourse to HRS 360 would provide a clear
outline of the procedure to be followed in this general kind of case, then I must
honestly say that I would still not know how to prosecute the appeal in Mrs. G's
specific case. I have carefully reviewed the minutes of the hearing. I do not in any way
wish to appear facetious, but I have no way of knowing what findings of fact the board
made, nor upon what conclusions of law their decision rested. I suggest that this result
had clear and specific procedural rules been available for the
would have been avoided
77
guidance of the board.

He also expressed his shock at the way the board had proceeded:
What is to become of the present record? Will it be read by the new panel? Although
I fully appreciate the need for wide evidentiary latitude in such cases, I find the
"record" in this one nearly astonishing. This is most certainly not to say that any
member of the panel or of the staff was prejudiced or otherwise acted improperly. It is
rather to say that completely natural human curiosity does not seem to have been
curbed in that manner in which the basic principles of evidence would dictate. I
suggest that this kind of problem could be avoided if eviction panels were assisted by
legal counsel. In this case it is difficult for me to imagine how anyone could remain
impartial after reading the existing record.

Indeed, so concerned was this attorney about the board's procedural
deficiencies that, at the conclusion of his argument to the Commissioners on
behalf of his client, he spoke not of why his client should be allowed to stay in
housing, but rather of his willingness to volunteer his services to help the
eviction board get its procedural house in order.
Other cases filed by LASH attorneys at about the same time show similar
objections to the absence of published rules as well as objections to the
specific procedures the board did follow. For example, in a letter of appeal to
the Chairman of the Authority's Board of Commissioners, the same LASH
attorney who had handled Mrs. )'s case complained more on his own behalf
than on that of his client:
[I]n this present case and in previous cases I have had before the eviction board, I have
observed that the staff has a practice of placing before the board members a statement
of the case from the staff point of view. This statement invariably contains matters that
the staff does not intend to prove or rely on, but which is highly prejudicial. I request
that you instruct the staff not to place before the Commission members any such
material. I am sure your deputy attorney general will understand what I mean on this
7
point. 8

The last sentence is particularly revealing. The attorney seems to have given
up on persuading lay people of proper procedure, but is confident that the
defects he alleges in the board's procedures will be obvious to and
unquestioned by any legally trained person.

to reenact the state law in administrative rules before the board could be officially established. There
is no evidence that this argument was ever pursued in court.
77. L.etter from LASH attorney to l)eputy Attorney General (Feb. 2, 1972).
78. L.etter from I.ASH attorney to Chairman, Authority Board of Commissioners (Oct. 19,
1970).
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XIII
THE TILEIA CASE:

1975-1977

The attack on the eviction board's procedures reached its zenith and, from
LASH's standpoint, achieved its greatest success in a class action lawsuit
commenced in 1975. 7'- At issue was not the eviction board's procedures,
but-so the parties at one time thought-its very existence.
In 1971 HUD began to move toward providing all public housing tenants
with the kind of due process that Hawaii's tenants had received for over a
decade.8 11 HUD's mechanism was to mandate a grievance procedure that
provided public housing tenants with the right to an informal hearing with
project management if they wished to dispute a local housing authority's
actions (including in most cases decisions to seek eviction)."' If the informal
hearing did not resolve the dispute, there was a further right to a formal
hearing before an impartial arbitrator or, if a single person could not be
agreed on, a three-person panel composed of one member chosen by each
82
party and a third person selected by the parties' nominees.
Although the Authority's eviction board exceeded the constitutional due
process requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Thorpe
v. Housing Authority oJ the City of Durham,"" it did not fit the model of the HUD
regulations. The Authority was aware of this and had been considering
possible courses of action for some time when LASH forced the issue with its
suit.8 4 The suit dragged on in federal court for over a year, but it was clear
that LASH was correct on the merits. With this in mind, the Authority and
LASH negotiated a settlement that provided for a grievance procedure
following the HUD model.
The implications of this settlement for the future of the eviction board
were at first unclear. At one point, as the settlement was being implemented,
the Authority put all its eviction actions on hold for several months for fear
that the board's procedures were invalid. At about the same time, there were,
in several projects at least, tenant polls on whether the eviction board might
serve as a substitute for the HUD-mandated grievance procedure. This
79. See Tileia, Cir. No. 75-0107 (D. Haw. filed Apr. 16, 1975). Fhe case was ultimately settled, so
there is no reported decision. So far as we can determine, the case did not grow out of a specific
eviction action but was more in the nature of a preemptive strike at the Authority's eviction process.
'he rights it aimed at securing existed outside the eviction context as well as within it.
80. HUD Circulars RHM 7465.8 (Feb. 22, 1971) and RHM 7465.9 (Feb. 22, 1971). Circular
RHM 7465.8 is titled "Requirements and Recommendations to be Reflected in Tenant Dwelling
Leases for Low-Rent Public Housing Projects." Circular RHM 7465.9 bears the title "Grievance
Procedures in Low-Rent Public Housing Projects."
81. Supra note 80.
82. Id.
83. 336 U.S. 670 (1967).
84. h appears from the records of this litigation that a number of the arguments LASH used
were taken fiom material that had been used in cases brought by federally funded legal service
organizations in otherjurisdictions. One LASH informant recalled that the case fit in with a national
"'hotusing law project," and was stimulated by it.

Page 135: Autumn 1988]

LAWYERS AND INFORMAL JUSTICE

whether the Authority
polling suggested that there was some question about
85
could continue to use its board to process evictions.
The eviction board and its procedures were, however, neither coextensive
with nor inconsistent with the HUD-mandated grievance option. On the one
hand, many issues unrelated to evictions could be grieved under the HUD
procedure. On the other hand, the HUD procedures specifically provided
that a tenant, by grieving an issue, forfeited no other rights to which she was
legally entitled.8 " Since under Hawaii law public housing tenants had a right
to a decision by the eviction board before they could be compelled to leave
housing, tenants who grieved eviction-related issues and lost still had a right
to a board hearing.

7

LASH, as far as we can determine from records and interviews, took no
particular stand on this issue. Their claim had been that the eviction board
did not comply with HUD regulations, and not that the board had to be
displaced by an institution that did comply. And LASH's activity after
winning the stipulated agreement did not focus on the eviction board. Rather,
LASH was concerned with the implementation of the HUD regulations and
with its role in monitoring the implementation procedures to be sure that the
terms of the stipulated agreement were met.
XIV
RECENT HISTORY:

1979-1987

Tileia marks a watershed in the history of the eviction board and in LASH's
activities on behalf of tenants threatened with eviction. For a variety of
reasons, of which this case was only a small part, the Authority after Tileia
began to rationalize and toughen its entire eviction process. As we have
already noted, in 1979 a full-time employee, A, was hired to evaluate and
oversee the Authority's eviction process and to handle all cases brought
before the board, and a full-time secretary was assigned to handle the
paperwork that evicting tenants requires. 8 At about the same time, a second
eviction panel was created to accelerate the pace of evictions by having the
85.

The HUI) grievance regulations permitted deviations from specified procedures if tenants

approved. 'hus the voting implies that the Authority at one point thought that unless the board was
approved by its tenants as a substitute for the HU)-mandated procedure, it could no longer be used
to process eviction actions.
We do not know whether votes were taken at all projects. The Authority files that we reviewed
only reported the results of voting at some of the Authoritv's projects, but there seem to have been
votes scheduled at all of' them. [hen there was apparently a sudden loss of interest in the voting
procedure. Nothing more is recorded. It may, of course, be that some relevant records escaped us,
but interviews with people who worked for the Authority at the time suggest a similar petering out of
interest. Our guess is that the Authority realized that regardless of the tenants' preferences
regarding grievance procedures, the board could endure.
86. See HUI) Circulars, suipra note 80.
87. See HAW.REV. STAT.§ 360-5 (197 1). Hawaiian law has maintained this right to a hearing. See

HAW. REv. SiAT. § 360-5 (1988).
88. Before 1979 the Supervising Public Housing Manager handled actions before the board as
one of the many duties of his job, and the board's secretary was a woman who ordinarily had many

other responsibilities.
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board available to hear cases each week. Also, new board members began to
be selected with an eye to their likely strictness.
In 1980, at the instance of the Authority, the Hawaii State Legislature
amended the act establishing the eviction board to allow for easier service of
process, to restrict appeals, and, one might have argued, to imply that the
Authority had a right to an eviction if it proved a lease violation."1 Also,
effective January 1, 1981, more than a decade after LASH attorneys began
complaining that the hearing board should be bound by rules promulgated in
accordance with the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act, such rules were
enacted. By and large, the rules simply restated long-standing procedures.
Rights that tenants were given in the statute establishing the board, such as
rights to notice and counsel, were confirmed. With respect to hearing
procedures, the status quo was also confirmed for the rules, as we have
already noted, provide: "Hearings shall be conducted inan informal manner
unless otherwise required by law."!"' No rule addresses the requisites of a
board decision, but the board's secretary routinely incorporates the board's
decision into a statement whose boilerplate ensures that the written
pronouncement always asserts legally adequate findings of fact and law. The
boilerplate deals in pro forma fashion with another aspect of board
procedure-the failure to report particularistic findings of fact and law-that
LASH attorneys in the early 1970's had found woefully inadequate, but it
does not signal greater board attention to the factual and legal issues that
cases raise. Tenants fare less well under the revised procedures than they did
under the earlier ones that so disturbed the LASH attorneys of the late 1960's
and early 1970's. It is, however, likely that changes of this sort would have
occurred even without LASH pushing legalization on the Authority, although
LASH may have hastened them along.
LASH's response to the changes that have occurred in the Authority's
eviction procedures has been supportive and accommodative. Again it is
difficult to untangle the importance of various causes. It is likely that LASH's
attorneys are more comfortable with the presence of a legally knowledgeable
counterpart prosecuting evictions for the Authority than they were when they
had to deal with a Supervisory Public Housing Manager who was not legally
sophisticated or, occasionally, with different deputy attorney generals who,
although unfamiliar with the board's procedures, were appointed to prosecute
particular contested cases. LASH attorneys have also ceased challenging the
board's basic ways of proceeding. Even though the board's modes of
procedure and decisionmaking differ little from what they were in the late
89. See HANW. REV. STAT. §§ 360-1 to 360-9 (1988) (amended 1980). The 1980 amendment that
might have been interpreted in this fashion was apparently not read in this way b A.,who was in
office when the statute passed, and it was definitely not read this way by B. his successor. In one
memorandum we discovered, B specifically noted that the board has the authority to withhold an
eviction even when there is a lease violation. In addition, the legislative history of the 1980
amendments, including the Authority's statements on behalf of the bill, contains no suggestion that
the board's discretion was to be changed.
90. HAW.Aim. RU~LEs, ch. 501, § 17-501-12(c) (1981).
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1960's and early 1970's and seem to disadvantage tenants where they do
differ, LASH attorneys no longer appear to be bothered by them. This may
be because the procedures have now been duly enacted in accordance with
HUD regulations and Hawaii administrative law and so are open to no
obvious legal attack. Indeed, LASH may now regard them as legitimate.!"
The acceptance of the Authority's eviction procedures may also reflect the fact
that from 1980 to 1984 many of the eviction actions handled by LASH were
assigned to the same paralegal, who became a repeat player in his relations to
the Authority's prosecutors and the eviction board. Finally, it must be noted
that the period we are discussing corresponds with the initiation and height of
the Reagan revolution. LASH attorneys in the 1980's may simply have been
less radical and less aggressive in their dealings with welfare authorities than
they were ten to fifteen years earlier, or they may have had fewer resources to
devote to a system that, in most respects, functions fully in accord with the
law.
The LASH attorneys and paralegals who have handled public housing
evictions during the past decade and the three Authority employees who have
prosecuted eviction actions over the same period each told the first author
that they have had a good working relationship with their nominal
adversaries. The characteristics of a good working relationship have,
however, changed over the years. In 1980 and 1981, when A was the
Authority's eviction specialist, a good working relationship meant that a
LASH attorney or paralegal could call A and settle the case before a hearing, if
a settlement was feasible. In 1987, when the board almost always evicted
tenants owing money at the time of the hearing and conditionally deferred
tenants who had cleared their debts, a good working relationship meant that
LASH respected the Authority's actions as within its legal rights, and
ordinarily refused to take non-payment cases to hearing because they were
sure losers and, as such, a waste of resources.
A good working relationship does not mean that LASH now capitulates in
all cases or is unwilling to be aggressive. Where it appears that the board
might respond sympathetically to an aspect of a tenant's story, the LASH
attorney, or more commonly a paralegal, will try to put that story before the
board. Where a legal objection can be made, it will be made. But blanket
challenges or objections to the board's basic procedures like those
91. There is one procedure that LASH attorneys only appear to accept: the Authority's practice
with respect to stipulated agreements. Stipulated agreements are agreements that are most often
entered into by tenants who, having been evicted by the board for non-payment of rent, succeed in
clearing their rent debt before their opportunity to appeal has lapsed. In these circumstances the
Authority's Commission will routinely ratify a stipulated agreement between the tenant and the
Authority whereby the Authority agrees not to seek a writ of possession and the tenant agrees to pay
her rent when due for 12 months and to waive all rights to a hearing or appeal should the Authority
seek to evict her for a violation of aty lease condition. LASH's position is that requiring tenants to
waive their hearing rights for future violations other than non-payment violates HUD regulations and
due process. This position may well be correct. Occasionally a lawyer has been able to negotiate a
stipulated agreement that does not contain this objectionable clause, but ordinarily the Authority has
been insistent, and I.ASH has acquiesced because each client's direct interest is to remain in housing.
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encountered in the late 1960's and early 1970's are heard only occasionally, in
a few cases handled by private counsel. Nor are LASH attorneys, while
accepting the board's authority and procedures, unwilling to challenge the
Authority on more substantive matters. In a 1984 case, for example, LASH
got a temporary restraining order to let a tenant return to her unit after the
1 2 They successfully
sheriff had locked her out.9
argued that the tenant had
paid her entire rent debt before the Authority's writ of possession had issued
and that under Hawaii's general landlord-tenant statute this stays the writ.9:1
Strangely enough, LASH and the Authority's tenants appear to have made
little use of the grievance procedure that LASH worked so hard to achieve.
We found evidence of a few formal grievances filed in the first few years after
Tileia, but almost never in recent years has a board case been preceded by a
grievance hearing, and the project managers report that such hearings are
rare for any purpose.
The absence of formal grievance hearings also suggests a lack of militancy
on the part of LASH in recent years, for at a minimum the grievance hearing
is a procedural obstacle that can be placed in the way of Authority efforts to
evict and so is likely to give tenants a few months more in housing.94
Moreover, in one kind of case at least, it appears that the grievance procedure
might be especially beneficial. These are cases in which the tenant is accused
of the fraudulent concealment of income at the time of an annual income
reexamination. Because rents are based on income, the discovery of
concealed income results in the assessment of backcharges. Tenants often
cannot pay such charges, for they may amount to thousands of dollars; but
even where the tenant might pay, the Authority will ordinarily seek to evict for
the fraud, and it may even refer such cases to the state attorney general's
office for prosecution. A common tenant response to such charges is to argue
misunderstanding: The tenant did not know that a certain kind of incomesuch as a part-time job, overtime, temporary employment-had to be
reported. Often such claims are plausible, for the tenant speaks English
poorly or not at all, and there is no written record of what an income
reexaminer told her.
In the early years of the grievance procedure, several tenants grieved
project managers' decisions to seek their eviction for fraudulent concealment
92. This case is not reported, and the authors' confidentiality agreement with the Authority
prevents the disclosure of a case name or docket number.
93. Before a final order could issue, the Authority moved to evict the tenant for chronic lateness
in her rental payments. The tenant's attorney could find no legal ground to oppose this effort and
consented to a dismissal of the ongoing action.
94. Under the federal regulations, in cases where the tenant poses an immediate danger to
persons or property, an Authority decision to evict need not be grieved. See HUI) Lease & Grievance
Procedures, § 866.51, 40 Fed. Reg. 33.402 (1975). It is unclear whether grieving an authority's
decision to evict for non-payment of rent may be conditioned on the tenant's putting rent as it
accrues in escrow. This is the case if the dispute is over the amount of'rent charged, but it is not clear
that this requirement extends to the decision to evict because rent is owing. In the first few years
after Tileia the Authority appears to have interpreted its decision to evict for non-payment of rent as
grievable without an escrow requirement. In recent years it appears that the Authority's position on
this issue has changed.
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and prevailed before three-member grievance panels that bought their
"misunderstanding" arguments. It is by no means clear that the eviction
board would have decided the same way, for the board members' experience
can make them skeptical of excuses they have heard before and may give them
more faith in the Authority's procedural routines than that accorded by a
panel hearing a single case. '95 Moreover, even if a grievance panel found for
the Authority, the tenant would have lost nothing by proceeding with the
grievance, for the right to an eviction board hearing would remain.
While LASH apparently does not initiate many formal grievances, it may
take advantage of another aspect of the grievance process. This is the
provision for an informal hearing between the tenant and project manager
that is a prelude to a formal grievance hearing. The LASH paralegal who
handled most of the Authority's public housing business from 1980 through
1984 said that he saw the informal hearing as a tool that allowed him to meet
with management, and that he had settled a number of cases in this way. Such
cases ordinarily do not show up on the eviction board's dockets, and so we
can say little about them.
It is interesting that LASH in the 1980's may have used the informal aspect
of the grievance procedure but allowed cases to be brought to the eviction
board rather than to a grievance panel when informal discussion did not
dissuade the Authority from attempting to evict. It may be that LASH
attorneys preferred the familiar-informal negotiations or a hearing before a
board with procedures they had come to know well-to the ad hoc informality
of a grievance panel.l' One thing is clear: From the LASH perspective-in
part because of pressure it had applied-the nightmare that was the eviction
board of the late 1960's and early 1970's has ended. The board of that era
was replaced by a new board with procedures that lawyers could respect.
Yet most changes are merely matters of form. The board now has legal
legitimacy, for it complements rather than preempts HUD's grievance
procedures, and it is authorized not only by the state statute but by duly
promulgated administrative regulations. Its decisions read more like legal
decisions, for they include boilerplate conclusions of law and findings of fact.
The procedures before the board, on the other hand, remain essentially as
they have always been, although after 1980 it is by regulation as well as
practice that these procedures are informal. In fact, the only great substantive
change has been that tenants, particularly those charged with non-payment of
rent, are more likely to be evicted than they have ever been. Indeed, by 1987
the board had virtually surrendered the discretion to defer evictions that had
once been its most distinguishing and controversial characteristic. In
retrospect one can see that the systematic efforts of LASH to legalize the
95. The tenant board members appear to be particularly suspicious of tenant excuses of this
type.
96. It may also be that the use of the informal grievance hearings mentioned by one LASH
paralegal is less common than his remarks would suggest. We think this is a possibility because no
manager told us that LASH used informal grievances to negotiate matters they would not otherwise
have discussed with them. Thus our remarks in the text should be regarded as speculative.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 4

board's status and procedures pushed it in this direction. But one can also
see that, if the variety of forces that led to the board's current practices are
considered, the efforts of LASH were not that important9 7 In promoting the
legalization of the eviction process, LASH was pushing the Authority in
precisely the direction it wanted to go. Since the Authority's cases are
invariably strong and often indisputable, the Authority had little to lose in the
long run by legalization.
xv
CONCLUSION

We have seen in this article that, over a twenty-year period, lawyers have
from time to time involved themselves as defense counsel in the informal
adjudicatory processes of the Authority's eviction board. When this occurs, it
is most often a legal aid lawyer or paralegal who represents the tenant, but
one time out of five a tenant's legal representation will come from the private
bar. Legal representation in this setting is not common, for only about one in
twelve tenants over the two decades studied have had lawyers, and in more
than 40 percent of these cases the lawyers became involved only after the
initial hearing.118 Thus, the hearings remain largely as they were intended-as
informal hearings in which tenants without lawyers state their cases to lay
judges.99
When lawyers do get involved in eviction actions they may proceed in a
variety of ways. One is in a legalistic fashion. During the first ten years of the
period we are investigating, this often involved attempts to transform the
hearing into a more court-like proceeding or to challenge the basic legitimacy
of the eviction board's procedures. More recently, the legalistic style has
usually involved particularistic objections to the details of the Authority's case
handling. One result of the earlier legalism was to push the Authority toward
getting its legal house in order. Without making great changes in the way
eviction hearings were held, the Authority acted to bring its eviction process
more closely in accord with the requirements of formal law. This more
legalistic stance fit in nicely with the Authority's determination to make the
board more of a cog in the bureaucratic process of evicting tenants than a
discretionary, free-standing tribunal. Ironically, as the eviction process has
become more legally embedded, the tendency of tenants to be legally
represented, particularly by organized legal aid, has diminished. In a
situation where "guilt" is almost always clear, the Authority's increased
legalism means that there is less that lawyers are uniquely equipped to do.
We see this in the rise of a second style of representation that has become
more common in recent years-the tenant style. Lawyers representing tenants
can often do no more than make the kinds of cases and pleas that savvy
97.
98.

See Dynamics, supra note 8.

See siipra Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.
99. While the Authority is now represented by a lawyer, this lawyer, as we have noted, ordinarily
proceeds in an informal fashion.
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tenants have always made. These pleas, perhaps, have more credibility when
made by a professional intermediary than when made by a tenant, but this
benefit is unclear.
Sharing characteristics of the legalistic style and the tenant style of
representation is what we call the service style. Lawyers who adopt this style
perform some service for the tenant that draws upon their professional
knowledge but is not aimed at refuting the legal basis of the Authority's case
for eviction. Examples include collecting money past due from welfare
agencies, helping a tenant file for bankruptcy, or aiding a tenant to secure a
divorce. This service then allows the attorney-in a tenant style argumentto claim that the problem giving rise to the eviction action has been or is likely
to be resolved.
In our judgment, lawyers have helped tenants avoid eviction in about 29
percent of the cases in which they appeared."' In about another 18 percent
of the cases, it may be that their presence was crucial to a positive outcome. I",i
These cases, however, represent only a small fraction-our estimate is about 3
percent-of the cases on the eviction board's docket over twenty years., 112
While more tenants would have benefitted from attorneys had they been
generally available over the years, the number of unrepresented tenants who
would have benefitted from representation is probably not large. Most
unrepresented tenants either vacated without a hearing or were allowed to
stay and were evicted only if they failed to meet conditions that had been set.
Of those evicted at the hearing, about two-thirds were evicted for not paying
their rent. Most of these tenants are unlikely to have benefitted from legal
representation, although in some cases an attorney might have been able to
secure welfare funds with which the tenant could have paid her debt. Finally,
it is unlikely that lawyers would have been as effective with those in our
sample who were unrepresented as they were with those they did represent,
since the represented were presumably self-selected and selected by attorneys
as people with cases likely to benefit from legal assistance.
What is far more important to a tenant's fate than the presence of an
attorney are the policies that the Authority and its eviction board follow.
These policies changed over the years so that by 1987 tenants brought before
the board were more likely to be evicted than they had ever been. The
contribution of defense lawyers to this situation was not crucial. But in
pushing the Authority toward greater legalism, these lawyers were
cooperating in creating the kind of process that would make eviction,
regardless of charge, the dominant outcome.
It would be a mistake to conclude that lawyers have no place in the
Authority's eviction process or that they cannot on occasion help individual
100. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. In a large proportion of these cases, lawyers, as we have noted, represent tenants on appeal
either because they are acquired only after the board has voted to evict or because their
representation before the board w'as unavailing. Thus, the presence of attorneys does not affect the
eviction board's decisions in sonic cases %%-here it affects the Authoritv's final action.

180

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 51: No. 4

tenants. But it would be equally mistaken to conclude that lawyers, by
participating in this process, can make the typical tenant's situation much
better. Research in other contexts is necessary to establish a more general
theory of when lawyers make a difference in institutions of informal justice.
This case study suggests that the kinds of cases a tribunal hears, the rules it
applies, and the nature of the adversary's representation are likely to be
crucial independent variables.

